

APPROVED

By Order No 22.3-37 of 4 April 2012 of the
Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety
Inspectorate
(version of Order No 22.3-107 of 22 July
2025 of the Acting Head of the State Nuclear
Power Safety Inspectorate)

NUCLEAR SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
BSR-1.6.1-2025
PHYSICAL SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES, NUCLEAR SITES, NUCLEAR
MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE MATERIALS

CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.6.1-2025 "Physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear power sites, nuclear material and nuclear fuel cycle " (hereinafter referred to as the Requirements) establish, the manner, in which the license holders in accordance with the Article 22(1) of the Law referred to in sub-clause 2.2 of the present Requirements must organise and ensure the physical security of the nuclear facilities, nuclear sites, nuclear material referred to in Annex 1 of the Law referred to in sub-clause 2 of the Requirements in the quantities specified in this Annex (hereinafter referred to as Nuclear Material) and nuclear fuel cycle materials (hereinafter referred to as Physical Security). The requirements are mandatory for natural and legal persons who ensure and/or are involved in ensuring the physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear sites, nuclear material and nuclear fuel cycle materials.

CHAPTER II
LINKS

2. The requirements refer to the following legislation and documents:
- 2.1. regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 ([EU](#)) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive [95/46/EC](#) (General Data Protection Regulation);
 - 2.2. Law on Nuclear Safety of the Republic of Lithuania;
 - 2.3. Law on Nuclear Power of the Republic of Lithuania;
 - 2.4. Law on Radiation Safety of the Republic of Lithuania;
 - 2.5. Law on Radioactive Waste Management of the Republic of Lithuania;
 - 2.6. Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection of the Republic of Lithuania;
 - 2.7. Law on State and Official Secrets of the Republic of Lithuania;
 - 2.8. Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data of the Republic of Lithuania;
 - 2.9. Rules for the Issuance of Licences and Permits for Activities in the Field of Nuclear Power, approved by the Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. 722 "On Approval of the Rules for the Issuance of Licences and Permits for Activities in the Field of Nuclear Power" of 20 June 2012;
 - 2.10. Description of the Procedure for the Organisation of the Physical Security of a Nuclear Facility, a Site of a Nuclear Facility, Nuclear and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Materials, approved by the Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. 670 "On the Approval of the Description of the Procedure for the Organisation of the Physical Security of a Nuclear Facility, a Site of a Nuclear Facility, Nuclear and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Materials" of 3 July 2019;

2.11. Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.1.1-2014 "Description of the Procedure for the Preparation of Nuclear Safety Requirements and Nuclear Safety Rules", approved by the Order of the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (hereinafter - VATESI) No 22.3-58 of 15 June 2009 "On the Approval of the Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.1.1-2014 "Description of the Procedure for the Preparation of Nuclear Safety Requirements and Nuclear Safety Rules"";

2.12. Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.4.1-2016 "Management System", approved by Order No 22.3-56 of the Head of VATESI of 21 June 2010 'On approval of the Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.4.1-2016 'Management System'";

2.13. Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-2.1.1-2009 "Requirements for the deterministic safety analysis of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant", approved by the Order of the Head of VATESI No. 22.3-118 of 23 November 2009 "On the Approval of the Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-2.1.1-2009 "Requirements for the deterministic safety analysis of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant"";

2.14. Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.4.4-2019 "Use of Experience of Persons Operating in the Nuclear Power Sector", approved by the Order of the Head of VATESI No. 22.3-148 "On Approval of the Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.4.4-2019 "Use of Experience of Persons Operating in the Nuclear Power Sector" dated 4 July 2019."

2.15. Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.8.2-2015 "Description of the categories of modifications of a nuclear facility and the procedure for carrying out modifications", approved by the Order of the Head of the VATESI No 22.3-99 of 7 October 2011 "On the approval of the Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.8.2-2015 "Description of the categories of modifications of a nuclear facility and the procedure for carrying out modifications"";

2.16. Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-3.1.2-2017 "Management of Radioactive Waste at Nuclear Power Facilities prior to its Disposal into a Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility", approved by the Order of the Head of the VATESI No 22.3-120 of 31 December 2010 "On the Approval of the Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-3.1.2-2017 "Management of Radioactive Waste at Nuclear Power Facilities prior to its Disposal into a Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility"."

2.17. Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.4.3-2017 "Human Resources of Organisations Carrying out Licensed Activities in the Field of Nuclear Power", approved by the Order of the Head of VATESI No. 22.3-160 of 20 September 2017 "On the Approval of the Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.4.3-2017 "Human Resources of Organisations Carrying Out Licensed Activities in the Field of Nuclear Power"";

2.18. International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Security Series Publication No. 27-G "Physical Security of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (Implementation of INFCIR/225/Revision 5)", 2018. *Physical Security of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (Implementation of INFCIRC/225/Revision 5)*);

2.19. Construction Technical Regulation STR 1.04.04:2017 "Building Design, Design Expert Evaluation", approved by Order No D1-738 of the Minister of the Environment of the Republic of Lithuania of 7 November 2016 "On Approval of the Construction Technical Regulation STR 1.04.04:2017 "Building Design, Design Expert Evaluation".

SECTION III DEFINITIONS

3. The definitions used in these Requirements:

3.1. **Physical barrier** - a mesh or blind fence, the walls, ceiling or floor of a building made of stone, brick, cinder block, concrete, steel or similar materials, or walls of similar construction (not part of a building), or any other physical barrier constructed in such a way and with such materials as to deter intruders.

3.2. **Physical security system** - a set of organisational and technical measures designed to protect a nuclear facility, its site, nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle materials against unlawful acts.

3.3. **Physical security system personnel** - a person whose main duties are to ensure the physical security of a nuclear facility, its site, nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle materials.

3.4. **Isolation area** - an area surrounded by physical barriers from the perimeter of the protected area inwards, which shall be equipped with video surveillance and intrusion and burglary detection

systems to detect persons or other objects entering the area. The isolation area is part of the protected area.

3.5. Intrusion and burglary detection system - A set of technical measures within the telecommunications infrastructure designed to detect unlawful activity and to notify physical security system personnel and, if necessary, other staff of the license holder by means of an audible and/or visual signal.

3.6. Vital Area - The protection area of a nuclear facility where vital equipment is installed.

3.7. Vital equipment - structures, systems and components of a nuclear facility, the unauthorised use of which could lead directly to a nuclear or radiological accident at the nuclear facility with a potential annual effective dose exceeding 20 millisieverts (mSv) to the public or 100 millisieverts (mSv) to workers.

3.8. Visitors - all persons lawfully entering a nuclear facility, its site or the premises, territory of a person carrying out activities related to nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle materials and/or vehicle carrying a cargo of nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle materials, except for employees for the license holder, of the person carrying out the activities, employees of the supplier of goods or services, personnel of the physical security system, employees of emergency services, of the authorities or bodies supervising the activities of applicants or licence holders, and of the specialists and experts of the organisations which they have engaged in the performance of their official duties.

3.9. Visitor escort - the license holder's employees or physical security system personnel assigned to escort visitors.

3.10. Unlawful act - an act involving the possession and/or unauthorised use, or a deliberate omission to perform required actions, concerning nuclear, nuclear fuel cycle or other radioactive material, a nuclear facility or, its site, or a vehicle transporting a cargo of nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle material, an act by which a nuclear facility, its site or means of transport is seized, the safety-important structures, systems and components of the nuclear facility are deliberately damaged, or the normal operation of the nuclear facility is otherwise disrupted, the physical security system is deliberately breached, or an attempt is made to carry out any such act.

3.11. Perimeter - the outer boundary of a nuclear facility site or a nuclear facility's protection area.

3.12. Response Force - the forces of the statutory bodies of the internal affairs, other forces or authorities located in the vehicles or premises, territory of a nuclear facility, its site or of a person carrying out activities related to nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle materials, which may be deployed in accordance with the procedure and in the cases established by law in order to prevent or interrupt the commission of an unlawful act.

3.13. Critical facilities - structures, systems and components of a nuclear facility with which an unlawful act at the nuclear facility could result in a nuclear or radiological incident with a potential annual effective dose exceeding 1 millisievert (mSv) to the public or 20 millisieverts (mSv) to workers.

3.14. Transportation Control Centre - an operational control centre to be established by the Consignor or Consignee of a shipment of nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle material, which shall communicate with an armed escort, continuously monitor the movement of the shipment and receive reports of attacks or cases of unauthorised seizure and/or use, transmit them to the authorities or bodies supervising the activities of the applicants or license holders and may coordinate the actions of the response force.

3.15. Inner area - the protection area of a nuclear facility in which important equipment is installed.

3.16. Other In the Requirements terms used in the Requirements correspond to the terms defined in sub-clauses 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17, and 2.19 of the Regulations.

CHAPTER IV PRINCIPLES OF PHYSICAL SECURITY

4. The following principles must be applied to physical security:

4.1. principle of graded approach, which means that the resources to ensure physical security and the technical and organisational measures used in the physical security system must be proportionate to the consequences that may result from an unlawful act against a nuclear facility, a site of a nuclear facility, or nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle material;

4.2. the principle of defence in depth, which means that a physical security system should consist of several independent layers of organisational and technical measures that would create a disadvantage for the perpetrator of an unlawful act (hereinafter referred to as "intruder") who tries to overcome these layers one by one.

CHAPTER V GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY

5. The license holder shall ensure that a physical security system is designed and installed at the nuclear facilities under its control, at the sites of those facilities and in vehicles, buildings or premises related to the activities regulated by the licence, and that the organisational arrangements for the physical security system are in place, and that the technical means of the physical security system are functioning in the manner prescribed in the documents describing the functioning of the technical means of those means from the manufacturer of those means and the license holder .

6. A physical security system may consist of the following separate systems:

6.1. intrusion and burglary detection system (hereinafter referred to as "alarm");

6.2. access control system;

6.3. video surveillance system;

6.4. communication system;

6.5. retention system;

6.6. response system;

6.7. other additional systems that the license holder shall put in place to ensure that the objectives of the physical security system are met. These systems must be described in the Physical Security Plan.

7. The organisational and technical means of the physical security system must fulfil the following security functions in order to achieve the objectives of physical security:

7.1. deter the intruder from committing an unlawful act;

7.2. detect and assess unlawful acts;

7.3. contain of intruder;

7.4. respond to unlawful acts.

8. The security functions must be carried out so as to:

8.1. deter a potential intruder from committing an unlawful act, i.e. by convincing them that overcoming a physical security system would be a difficult and demanding task and would lead to the abandonment of their objectives by those intending to commit an unlawful act. For deterrence purposes, signs or notices shall be placed at points of access to the protected area and/or premises to inform and warn that the area and/or premises are protected (e.g. to inform and warn that alarms are in place, to control access by persons and objects, to monitor video surveillance, and to prohibit unauthorised crossing of the boundaries of the area);

8.2. prevent potential intruders from committing an unlawful act, i.e. the attempted or actual commission of an unlawful act must be detected and assessed, and intruders must be detained to allow the response forces to perform their assigned functions.

9. Organisational arrangements for the physical security system:

9.1. The license holder shall establish a physical security policy, i.e., the intentions/objectives, priorities, activities and guiding principles in the field of physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear facility sites, nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle materials, as set out in the license holder's management documents;

9.2. The license holder shall have in place the license holder's management-approved normative technical documents governing physical security (hereinafter referred to as 'normative technical documents') and other management system documents setting out the duties and functions of those responsible for physical security.

10. Technical measures for the physical security system:

10.1. shall be checked at least once a month to ensure their functionality and shall be maintained to ensure that they function as specified in the documentation describing the operation of the technical means of the manufacturer and the license holder. The technical means of the physical security system for the protection of Category III nuclear material shall be inspected at least once every three months;

10.2. in the event of failure or otherwise inoperability of a technical measure, compensatory measures, including additional technical and/or organisational measures, shall be used. Compensatory measures are understood as temporary measures replacing a defective technical measure and ensuring the continuity of the performance of the protective functions until the defective measures are restored.

11. Physical security personnel, competences and training in physical security:

11.1. shall be staffed with at least the number of competent physical security personnel, as determined and documented by the license holder, who understand the principles of physical security and who are able to implement physical security legislation and normative technical documents, and who are able to plan, control and evaluate the security functions to be performed;

11.2. must be satisfied, before any person is recruited as a physical security personnel, that he or she meets the qualification requirements and will be able to perform the expected functions of a physical security personnel as provided for in the regulations governing it;

11.3. all physical security system personnel shall be familiar with and knowledgeable of the physical security legislation, normative technical documents for physical security and the roles of physical security system personnel;

11.4. The employees of the license holder, the person supplying cargo, services and/or works to the license holder (hereinafter referred to as supplier), whose duties are not directly related to physical security, shall be trained in physical security in accordance with the procedures established by the license holder. The license holder's and supplier's personnel shall be aware of how to behave in the event of an attempted unauthorised entry or unauthorised access to a nuclear facility, an attempted unauthorised seizure and/or use of nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle material or equipment that ensures the normal operation of a nuclear facility, other unlawful acts, and a threat to carry out such unlawful acts.

12. The license holder shall have organisational and/or technical measures in place to ensure that during emergency evacuation (including training) the nuclear facility, the site of the nuclear facility, nuclear and nuclear fuel cycle materials are not illegally seized.

13. The promotion and development of a security culture must be promoted and developed as a necessary factor to ensure the effective achievement of physical security objectives, so that all those involved in physical security understand that unlawful acts are likely, and that the duties and functions assigned to them in the field of physical security, in preventing unlawful acts and ensuring physical security, are important and must be carried out responsibly.

14. Developing, reviewing, updating and coordinating the Physical Security Plan:

14.1. the Physical Security Plan shall be prepared in accordance with the Rules for the Preparation of the Physical Security Plan, approved by the Head of VATESI, which shall specify the structure and content of the Physical Security Plan;

14.2. the Physical Security Plan shall be reviewed at the frequency and under the conditions set out in Article 21(8) of the Law referred to in sub-clause 2.2 of the Requirements;

14.3. if a review of the Physical Security Plan reveals that the Physical Security Plan is not in line with the actual situation, the physical security requirements are not being met and/or the physical security objectives are not being met, the Physical Security Plan must be updated;

14.4. In the case provided for in point 14.3 of the Requirements, the updated Physical Security Plan must be submitted for approval to VATESI before the expiry of a period of 3 years from the date of the last approval of the Physical Security Plan by VATESI;

14.5. the Physical Security Plan, when first prepared and, in the case of point 14.3 of the Requirements, updated, must be submitted to VATESI (in the cases specified in the Law referred to in point 2.9 of the Requirements, as one of the documents required for obtaining a licence or permit, and in other cases for approval);

14.6. after assessing the compliance of the Physical Security Plan, prepared for the first time or updated in the case provided for in sub-clause 14.3 of the Requirements, with the legal acts regulating physical security and the requirements laid down in the normative technical documents on nuclear safety, as well as with the factual circumstances, the Head of the VATESI shall take a decision on the documentation:

14.6.1. when a Physical Security Plan is submitted for a licence or permit in the cases specified in the Law referred to in sub-clause 2.9 of the Requirements, it shall be decided and communicated in accordance with the procedures and within the deadlines specified in the Law referred to in sub-clauses 2.2 and 2.9 of the Requirements;

14.6.2. when a Physical Security Plan is submitted in cases other than those referred to in sub-clause 14.6.1 of the Requirements, the Head of VATESI shall take a decision on the alignment within the time limits set out in Article 34(2) of the legal act referred to in sub-clause 2.2 of the Requirements. The Head of VATESI shall take a decision to approve the Physical Security Plan if it complies with the legislation governing physical security, the requirements laid down in the normative technical documents for nuclear safety and the factual circumstances;

14.7. shall be informed in writing of the decision of the Head of VATESI referred to in sub-clause 14.6.2 of the Requirements, no later than within 3 working days of the decision.

15. Information and data protection:

15.1. classified information on the physical security system shall be accessible only to those persons who, in the performance of their official duties, have a need to know classified information;

15.2. the physical security computer and information systems of the site must be ensured to have the capacity to remain immune to accidental events or unlawful acts that would compromise the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information or data stored, processed and transmitted;

15.3. filming and photographing of facilities and equipment on the site of a nuclear facility may be carried out only by decision of the licence holder and in accordance with the procedures laid down by the licence holder. The description of these procedures shall include:

15.3.1. conditions for rights of filming, including the granting and withdrawal of the right to film and take photographs;

15.3.2. the duties of the persons filming or taking photographs;

15.3.3. conditions for bringing in, taking out and storing, filming and photography equipment on and off the site;

15.3.4. filming procedures for controlling filming and photography and controlling the data recorded.

16. Reporting of physical security incidents:

16.1. the license holder shall provide information to VATESA on unusual events related to physical security in accordance with the procedures and deadlines set out in the legal act referred to in sub-clause 2.14 of the Requirements;

16.2. The license holder referred to in Article 22(1)(1) to (4) of the Law referred to in sub-clause 2.2 of the Requirements, within one month of the end of each quarter of each year, and the license holder referred to in Article 22(1)(5) to (7) of the Law referred to in Article 22(1)(5) of the Law referred to in sub-clause 2.2 of the Requirements, and within one month of the end of the calendar year, must submit to the VATESI a report on any other event that has occurred during the preceding period, relating to the:

16.2.1. detention of persons showing signs of alcohol, narcotic, psychotropic or other psychoactive substances use at a nuclear facility, at the site of a nuclear facility, or in a vehicle with a load;

16.2.2. attempted access to a nuclear facility, nuclear facility site or vehicle with cargo by persons with signs of alcohol, narcotic, psychotropic or other psychoactive substance use;

16.2.3. breaches of the procedures for issuing and using permits for persons and vehicles;

16.2.4. violations of the procedures for checking persons entering and leaving the checkpoint, vehicles entering and leaving the checkpoint, as well as objects and cargo being transported;

16.2.5. breaches of the procedure for the transport of objects during the checkpoint;

16.2.6. violations of the filming and photography procedures.

CHAPTER VI
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF A NUCLEAR FACILITY AND
NUCLEAR FACILITY SITE

SECTION 1
PHYSICAL SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FACILITY SITE WHERE CONSTRUCTION
WORK IS BEING CARRIED OUT

17. The requirements of this Section shall apply to licences referred to in Article 22(1)(1) and (3) of the Law referred to in sub-clause 2.2 of the Requirements, holders.

18. To prevent unlawful acts that could directly or indirectly lead to a nuclear and/or radiological accident during the operation, decommissioning or maintenance of a closed radioactive waste disposal facility, disrupt the normal operation of the nuclear facility or illegally seize nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle materials, the physical security of the nuclear facility site on which construction work is being carried out (hereinafter referred to as 'the construction site') shall be ensured without interruption.

19. The license holder shall establish procedures for granting and withdrawing access to the construction site for persons and vehicles to ensure that access to the construction site is granted only for such periods and under such conditions as the license holder considers necessary for the execution of the construction work of the nuclear facility. The description of these procedures shall include:

19.1. Conditions for granting and withdrawing access to the construction site:

19.1.1. for employees of the license holder, the supplier and visitors;

19.1.2. special and emergency services (e.g. site security, police, ambulance, response forces, state fire brigade, gas, electricity grids) on call and/or deployed to deal with accidents and incidents;

19.1.3. inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), if they have the right and authority to visit the site;

19.2. the form(s) of the identification card issued to persons granted access.

20. The personal identification card certifying that a person has been granted unescorted access to the site of a nuclear facility must contain the following entries and the details of the holder of the identification card:

20.1. name (s);

20.2. the name of the company or organisation (abbreviation of the name);

20.3. a photo of the person's face that corresponds to their actual age and appearance.

21. The personal identification card certifying that a person has been granted escorted access to the construction site must be marked "ESCORTED".

22. All records of access granted and identification cards issued shall be kept for at least 5 years.

23. The description of the procedure referred to in point 19 of the Requirements shall be agreed with VATESI. The decision on the alignment of this document shall be taken by the Head of VATESI within 20 working days of its receipt at the latest. The Head of VATESI shall take a decision to approve the Schedule of Procedures referred to in point 19 of the Requirements, provided that it complies with the provisions of the Requirements and with the requirements of Article 36 of the Law referred to in sub-point 2.3 of the Requirements.

24. All persons on the construction site must carry a personal identification card with them. The card shall be worn visibly on the person, except where the wearing of the card may interfere with the person's ability to carry out physical construction work.

25. Visitor escort:

25.1. visitors to the construction site must be admitted only with a visitor escort, who must accompany the visitor throughout the visit to the construction site;

25.2. visitors must be accompanied by a person(s) authorised to have unescorted access to the construction site;

25.3. depending on the number of visitors, a sufficient number of escorts must be appointed to ensure that the person(s) appointed to accompany the visitor(s) comply with the internal rules of the

construction site ;

25.4. IAEA and Euratom inspectors, staff of the authorities or bodies supervising the activities of applicants or license holders (hereinafter referred to as 'supervising authorities or bodies') and specialists and experts from organisations they have engaged, must be provided with an escort of visitors on the construction site.

26. All vehicles must display a vehicle identification card in an externally visible position while on the construction site.

27. The construction site shall be surrounded by a physical barrier along its perimeter to control access to the site.

28. During the site preparation phase, the following must be in place:

28.1. has an access control system that allows visual access control to the construction site based on staff lists and identity documents;

28.2. identity checks of workers on the construction site, at a frequency and in a manner determined by the licence holder, to check for unauthorised access to the construction site.

29. During the general construction works (prior to the arrival and facility of the safety-vital structures, systems and components of the nuclear facility (hereafter referred to as "SS BEO CSCs")), the following shall be present:

29.1. an access control system in place to ensure that only authorised persons and vehicles are admitted and excluded from the construction site;

29.2. ability to detect an attempted unauthorised entry or exit, and ability to apprehend those attempting to enter or leave unlawfully;

29.3. inspection, at a frequency and in a manner determined by the license holder, of the items, work tools, equipment, building structures and materials brought into and/or onto the construction site to check for the introduction of prohibited items according to the list of prohibited items determined by the license holder;

29.4. inspection of the construction site and the buildings and premises thereon at a frequency and in a manner to be determined by the license holder, in order to determine whether the construction site and the buildings and premises thereon are free from unauthorised persons and prohibited articles;

29.5. hidden works on the construction site shall be monitored in accordance with the procedures established by the licence holder.

30. During the facility and deployment of the SS BEO KSK, the following shall be present:

30.1. compliance with the provisions of Clause 29 of the Requirements;

30.2. organisational and/or technical measures in place to protect the SS BEO KSK from unlawful acts related to their possible hijacking and possible disruption of their functionality.

SECTION 2

PHYSICAL SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FACILITY AND SITE OF NUCLEAR FACILITY, EXCEPT FOR THE SITES WHERE CONSTRUCTION OR DECOMMISSIONING WORK IS BEING CARRIED OUT

31. The requirements of this Section shall apply to licences referred to in Article 22(1)(2), (3) and (5) of the Law referred to in point 2.2 of the Requirements, holders.

32. A nuclear facility and the site of a nuclear facility, other than a site where construction work on the nuclear facility is being carried out, and the approaches to such a site, shall be divided into nuclear facility protection areas (hereinafter referred to as "protection areas").

33. The types of buffer areas are:

33.1. restricted area;

33.2. protected area;

33.3. inner area;

33.4. vital area.

34. The area on the outer side of the perimeter of the protected area of the nuclear facility (site access) shall be classified as a restricted area, the size of which shall be determined in accordance with Annex 1 to the Requirements.

35. The entire site of a nuclear facility must be designated as a protected area.

36. The structures of a nuclear facility and/or the individual rooms within these structures containing vital equipment shall be designated as an inner area or vital area.

37. The structures of a nuclear facility and/or the individual rooms of these structures containing vital equipment shall be designated as a vital area.

38. Nuclear material must be used and stored:

38.1. Category I - vital area;

38.2. Category II - in an inner or vital area;

38.3. Category III and not included in the table of categories - in a protected, inner or vital area.

39. At a nuclear facility, the vital equipment, use and storage of nuclear material classified as Category II shall be located at least two physical barriers away.

40. The vital equipment of a nuclear facility and the use and storage of nuclear material classified as Category I shall be located at least three physical barriers away.

41. Radioactive waste classified as Category I or II nuclear material, which is no longer suitable for further use due to its physical form, does not pose a risk to humans and the environment from ionising radiation and is practically incapable of being purified due to the complexity of the technology and the resources required, may be subject to the physical security requirements of a category of nuclear material one step lower (Category II or III, as appropriate). The conditions referred to in this point shall be assessed and justified in the analysis of the area zoning of the nuclear facility.

42. The physical barriers or parts of the physical barriers of the vital area, the inner area and the protected area must not overlap. This Clause does not apply to power units of nuclear power plants with nuclear reactors of the RBMK-1500 type and to vital area barriers and parts thereof located therein.

43. Taking into account the characteristics of the nuclear facility and its site, the activities carried out or planned to be carried out at the nuclear facility, the nuclear material used and stored, the anticipated threat to the nuclear facility, for the purposes of the area zoning referred to in point 32 of the Requirements, an analysis of the area zoning of the nuclear facility shall be carried out, which shall:

43.1. identify and assess any initial events that may result from the unlawful act, where equipment failures or malfunctions may indirectly influence the increase in the annual effective dose to the public and/or workers (e.g. an initial event resulting from the unlawful act that may cause a breach of the SS BEO KSK, where such a breach will influence the increase in the annual effective dose). Deterministic safety and/or probabilistic safety analyses should be used to identify and assess such events;

43.2. identify and assess all initial events that may result from the unlawful act, which may lead directly to equipment failure or damage, i.e. due to the use of an external energy source (e.g. use of explosive substances or incendiary devices, high-energy mechanical effects), which may have an impact on the increase of the annual effective dose to the population and/or workers (e.g. damage to a radioactive waste container using explosive substances, where such damage will have a direct impact on the increase of the annual effective dose);

43.3. an assessment of the radiological consequences of the initial events referred to in 43.1 and 43.2, supported by calculations, must be made. If, due to calculation limitations, it is not possible or not appropriate to assess partial damage to safety vital equipment or partial releases of radionuclides, it must be assumed that all damage to safety critical equipment or releases of radionuclides are complete, i.e. a conservative approach is taken;

43.4. the classification of the SS BEO KSK as major facilities or vital facilities, taking into account the thresholds for the increase in the annual effective dose to the population and/or workers resulting from the following breaches of the SS BEO KSK;

43.5. have a completed classification of nuclear material in accordance with the nuclear material category table in Annex 2 to the Requirements. It is recommended to refer to the document referred to in clause 2.18 of the Requirements for determining the category of nuclear material of different isotopes;

43.6. identify and define the identified protection areas and their boundaries.

44. Preparation, review, updating and coordination of the analysis document for the area zoning of a nuclear facility:

44.1. The analysis of the protection area zoning of the nuclear facility and its results, identifying and defining the identified protection areas and their boundaries, shall be documented and prepared in accordance with the standard content of the analysis of the protection area zoning of the nuclear facility specified in Annex 3 to the Requirements;

44.2. The Nuclear Facility Protection Area Zoning Analysis Document needs to be reviewed and updated:

44.2.1. in the event of a change in the perceived threat;

44.2.2. in the case of a modification of a nuclear facility which would result in the establishment of new initial events as specified in sub-clauses 43.1 and 43.2 of the Requirements. The reporting documents for the modification of a nuclear facility shall include information on whether the nuclear facility's area zoning analysis document has been reviewed (if the document does not need to be modified) and, if the review has identified a need to modify the document, whether the modified document has been submitted as well;

44.2.3. in the event of additional information on changes in the quantity, physical or chemical state and composition of nuclear or other radioactive material or on possible radiological effects that were not assessed in the previous analysis of the area zoning of a nuclear facility;

44.3. The document of the analysis of the division of the nuclear facility into protection areas, prepared for the first time and, in the case provided for in sub-clause 44.2 of the Requirements, updated, must be submitted to VATESI (in the cases specified in the legal act referred to in sub-clause 2.9 of the Requirements, as one of the documents required for the obtaining of a licence or permit, and in the other cases - for the approval). The Head of VATESI decides on the analysis document for the division of a nuclear facility into protection areas:

44.3.1. when submitted for a licence or permit under the Law referred to in sub-clause 2.9 of the Requirements, the decision shall be taken and communicated in accordance with the procedures and within the time limits laid down in the Law referred to in sub-clauses 2.2 and 2.9 of the Requirements;

44.3.2. when submitted in a case other than those referred to in sub-clause 44.3.1 of the Requirements, the Head of the VATESI shall take a decision on the approval. The Head of VATESI shall take a decision on the approval within the time limits set out in Article 34(2) of the legal act referred to in sub-clause 2.2 of the Requirements. The Head of VATESI shall take a decision to approve the security area zoning analysis document for a nuclear facility if the submitted document complies with the provisions of the Requirements;

44.4. the decision of the Head of VATESI referred to in sub-clause 44.3.2 of the Requirements, shall be notified in writing no later than within 3 working days of the decision.

45. After the approval of the analysis document on the division of the nuclear facility into protection areas, the license holder or applicant for this licence (hereinafter referred to as "the applicant") shall approve the list of the protection areas of the nuclear facility and the premises comprising them and submit it to VATESI.

46. Requirements for the restricted area:

46.1. The outer boundaries of the restricted area on roads used for public traffic shall be marked by the license holder with information signs. In the case where the restricted area of one nuclear facility is included in the restricted area of another nuclear facility and the external boundaries of the areas are different, only the external boundaries of the restricted area covering a larger area shall be marked with information signs;

46.2. restricted area shall have a clear strip along the perimeter of the protected area, free of any structures, facilities, vegetation or other obstructions that could be used to gain unauthorised access to the protected area through a physical barrier or to circumvent it. The width of the clear area, unless otherwise provided for in other legislation, shall be determined by and justified by the applicant or license holder in the nuclear facility's Physical Security Plan, taking into account the expected threat and the technical and organisational measures planned to be installed or implemented in the physical security system;

46.3. The vehicles of the license holder, employees of the supplier and visitors to the nuclear facility may be stored in a restricted area, but at such a distance from the protected area and behind such physical barriers that it is not possible to use vehicles belonging to persons referred to in this subclause to gain unauthorised access to, bypass, or damage the protected area.

47. Requirements for the protected area:

47.1. it shall be equipped with an alarm system at the perimeter of the protected area, including the structures forming the perimeter, and at all openings through which access to the protected area is possible, which shall enable the following functions at any time:

47.1.1. to detect attempted unauthorised entry into and unauthorised exit from the protected area;

47.1.2. to detect unauthorised attempts to disrupt the alarm itself;

47.1.3. to pinpoint the location of the event that triggered the alarm in real time;

47.1.4. to transmit alarm activation signals in audible and visual form to the primary and secondary protection stations;

47.2. to have a containment system in place - the protected area must be surrounded by a physical barrier to control access to the protected area and to detain the intruder;

47.3. A nuclear facility where nuclear power is used for the production of electricity and/or heat, where spent nuclear fuel is stored, where vital facilities are located and/or where high-level radioactive waste is present (with the exception of a deep repository for radioactive waste) shall be subject to patrols in the protected area;

47.4. A nuclear facility where nuclear power is used for the production of electricity and/or heat, where spent fuel is stored and/or where high-level radioactive waste is contained (except for a deep repository for radioactive waste) shall have an exclusion area from the perimeter of the protected area inwards:

47.4.1. The exclusion area shall be equipped with at least two independent types of alarm systems operating on different physical principles and at least one of these types of system shall be designed to monitor the area. This requirement shall not apply to a checkpoint within the exclusion area where physical security system personnel are on duty at all times;

47.4.2. The exclusion area shall be illuminated, wide and so maintained as to allow unimpeded detection of persons and other objects entering the area. Any activity is prohibited in the exclusion area, except for the maintenance of the area and the inspection and maintenance of the technical protection measures installed in the area. The exclusion area shall be free of any structures, facilities or other objects or vegetation which could be used to illegally bypass the exclusion area and which would interfere with the functioning of the alarm means and the detection of unauthorised objects and persons entering the area.

48. Requirements for the inner area:

48.1. IT shall be provided with an alarm system at the perimeter of the inner area, if other than the walls of buildings, and at all openings through which access to the inner area is possible, and/or in the rooms assigned to the inner area, which shall be capable at all times:

48.1.1. to detect attempted unauthorised entry into and exit from the inner zone;

48.1.2. to detect unauthorised attempts to disrupt the alarm itself;

48.1.3. to pinpoint the location of the event that triggered the alarm in real time;

48.1.4. to transmit alarm activation signals in audible and visual form to the primary and secondary protection stations;

48.2. must have a containment system in place - the inner area must be surrounded by a physical barrier that allows access control to the inner area and detention of the intruder.

49. Vital area requirements:

49.1. It shall be equipped with an alarm system - an alarm system shall be installed on the perimeter of the vital area and/or in the premises assigned to the vital area, which shall be capable at all times:

49.1.1. to detect attempted unauthorised entry into and unauthorised departure from a vital area;

49.1.2. to detect unlawful acts in the vital area and at the physical barriers of the vital area;

49.1.3. to detect unauthorised attempts to disrupt the alarm itself;

- 49.1.4. to pinpoint the location of the event that triggered the alarm in real time;
- 49.1.5. to transmit alarm activation signals in audible and visual form to the main and back-up security stations;
- 49.2. The vital area must be surrounded by a physical barrier to control access to the vital area and to deter intruders.
50. The license holder shall establish procedures for granting and withdrawing access for persons and vehicles to the protected area, the inner area and the vital area, ensuring that access to the protected area and/or the inner area and/or the vital area is granted in based on the need for an individual to enter the specific protected area or individual premises, and only for such period and under such conditions as the license holder considers necessary for the normal operation of the nuclear facility or for access to the facility. The description of these procedures shall include:
- 50.1. Conditions for granting and withdrawing access:
- 50.1.1. for employees of the license holder, the supplier and visitors;
- 50.1.2. special and emergency services (e.g. site security, police, ambulance, response forces, state fire brigade, gas, electricity grids) on call and/or deployed to deal with accidents and incidents;
- 50.1.3. IAEA and Euratom inspectors, if they have the right and authority to visit the nuclear facility's protection areas;
- 50.2. the prescribed form(s) of the identification card.
51. The personal identification card certifying that a person has been granted unescorted access must contain the following entries, as well as the details of the holder of the identification card:
- 51.1. name (s) and surname (font size must be at least 3 mm high);
- 51.2. employer's name or abbreviation;
- 51.3. a photograph of the person's face (size at least 30 x 35 mm), appropriate to their age and appearance.
52. The personal identification card certifying that a person has been granted escorted access must contain the words "ESCORTED" (font size must be at least 3 mm high).
53. All records of access granted to the protected area and/or the inner area and/or the vital area and the identification cards issued shall be kept for at least 5 years.
54. The description of the procedure referred to in Clause 50 of the Requirements shall be agreed with VATESI. The decision on the alignment of this document shall be taken by the Head of VATESI within 20 working days of its receipt at the latest. The Head of VATESI shall take a decision to approve the schedule of procedures referred to in point 50 of the Requirements, provided that it complies with the provisions of the Requirements and the requirements of Article 36 of the legal act referred to in point 2.3 of the Requirements.
55. A list of persons having access to each vital area shall be drawn up and reviewed at least annually and approved by the Licence Manager or his/her delegate. The list must include only staff permanently working on the premises and staff whose job description includes work on the premises.
56. All persons shall wear a visibly attached identification card while in the protected, inner or vital areas.
57. All vehicles in secure, indoor or vital areas must display a vehicle identification card in an externally visible position.
58. Controlling access to the protected area, the inner area and the vital area:
- 58.1. The license holder shall implement an access control system for protected, inner and vital areas;
- 58.2. The access control system, consisting of organisational and technical measures, must ensure that:
- 58.2.1. it shall only admit and release persons and vehicles to which the right has been granted, and only through the areas designated for entry or exit, recording the time of admission and release, the identity of the person being admitted and released, and the identification of the vehicle. The data on the presence in the protected, internal and vital areas must be kept for at least 36 months from the date of recording;
- 58.2.2. an attempted unauthorised entry or exit is detected, and those attempting to enter or leave illegally are apprehended;

58.2.3. an attempt to smuggle prohibited articles or materials (weapons, explosives, radioactive materials or other tools or materials of the intended threat) is detected and intercepted;

58.2.4. detect and intercept an attempt to smuggle prohibited items or materials (e.g. nuclear, nuclear fuel cycle or other radioactive materials);

58.2.5. transmit the alarm activation signal in audible and visual form to the primary and secondary protection stations;

58.3. be equipped with a pedestrian and vehicle checkpoint for the screening of persons entering and leaving the protected area and vehicles entering and leaving the area;

58.4. have in place the procedures for opening and closing doors, gates, windows and other openings through which access to the protected, inner and vital areas is possible ensure and nobody would be able to enter, exit or bring in our out prohibited items and materials by gaining unauthorised access through the doors, gates, windows and other openings to the protected, inner and vital areas;

58.5. The licence holder shall establish procedures for the screening of persons entering and leaving the checkpoint, vehicles entering and leaving the checkpoint, and objects and cargo being transported;

58.6. The license holder shall establish procedures for the opening of doors, gates and other openings in the event of nuclear or radiological accidents, incidents or other unusual occurrences, or the threat of such occurrences;

58.7. vehicle control procedures, including screening at the checkpoint and escorting of visitors in the protected area, and the system of physical barriers, shall be such that vehicles cannot be used for the unauthorised seizure and/or use of nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle material or equipment for the normal operation of a nuclear facility or for any other unlawful act;

58.8. Only the driver and the person accompanying the material cargo being brought in/out, who have been granted access to the area, may enter/exit the protected area together with the vehicle, and all passengers must pass through the pedestrian checkpoint. An exception can only be made for special and emergency vehicles (e.g. security, police, ambulance, response force, state fire brigade) arriving on a call-out basis (the procedure for the exception is to be determined by the licence holder);

58.9. IAEA property and assets may only be inspected by technical means that do not damage and/or destroy them (including packaging and seals). Regardless of where such property and assets are located, upon presentation of documentation evidencing the lawful disposition of the property and assets (this provision does not apply to IAEA inspectors), such property and assets shall be free from search, seizure, requisition, confiscation, expropriation or other interference. Personal effects (other than IAEA property or assets) in the possession of IAEA inspectors shall be subject to inspection in accordance with the Requirements and the procedures established by the license holder;

58.10. Euratom's assets may only be inspected by technical means that do not damage and/or destroy them (including packaging and seals). No legal restraint can be imposed on Euratom property and assets without the authorisation of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Personal belongings (non- Euratom property) in the possession of Euratom inspectors shall be inspected in accordance with the Requirements and in accordance with the procedures set out by the licence holder.

59. Visitor escort:

59.1. Visitors to a nuclear facility must be admitted only with a visitor escort, who must accompany the visitor throughout the visit to the nuclear facility;

59.2. visitors must be accompanied by a person(s) authorised to have unescorted access to the relevant protection areas of the nuclear facility;

59.3. Depending on the number of visitors, a sufficient number of escorts shall be appointed to ensure that the person(s) appointed to accompany the visitor(s) comply with the internal procedures in force at the nuclear facility;

59.4. IAEA and Euratom inspectors in protected, inner or vital areas, and staff of supervising authorities or bodies and specialists and experts from their contracted organisations in inner and vital areas must be accompanied by a visitor escort;

59.5. Permanent authorised civil servants and employees of VATESI, appointed by the Head of VATESI, who are employed under employment contracts, and who carry out permanent

maintenance of a nuclear facility on the site of a nuclear facility, and who have the right to unescorted access to the protection areas of a nuclear facility, may be granted unescorted access to the inner and/or vital areas by the license holder by a separate written decision.

60. Surveillance and prevention:

60.1. The license holder shall install a video surveillance system that:

60.1.1. would enable continuous surveillance of the entire perimeter of the protected area, gates, turnstiles and doors of the entrance and access to the protected area, in order to accurately determine the cause of alarm triggering and to detect unlawful activity;

60.1.2. shall enable the surveillance of areas of the nuclear facility other than those referred to in Clause 60.1.1 of the Requirements in order to prevent the unauthorised seizure and/or use or other unlawful activity of nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle material or equipment that supports the normal operation of the nuclear facility, in order to accurately determine the cause of the alarm and to detect the unlawful activity;

60.2. all alarm activations shall be recorded at the alarm control point. Trigger data shall be collected and stored for at least 5 years;

60.3. all information recorded by the CCTV system shall be recorded on media and stored for 31 days;

60.4. discovering persons or vehicles in protected, inner or vital areas who are not authorised to be in these areas but are entering these areas, or suspecting that these persons may be committing an administrative offence or a criminal offence, the staff of the physical security system shall take measures to prevent the possible unlawful activity;

60.5. In the event of a nuclear reactor shutdown or during repair work at a nuclear facility, access control to the vital area shall be maintained as specified in clause 58 of these Requirements. Before a nuclear reactor is brought into operation following shutdown or repair work at a nuclear facility, it must be checked that no unauthorised equipment or explosive materials have been installed in the vital area that could damage or otherwise affect vital equipment.

61. A security station shall be installed by the licence holder as follows:

61.1. in a protected area, unless its facility elsewhere enables it to perform its assigned functions more efficiently;

61.2. having taken into account the threat anticipated, so as to be able to carry out its functions without interruption;

61.3. by applying physical security requirements according to the category of equipment and nuclear material in the nuclear facility:

61.3.1. if the nuclear facility contains vital equipment or uses and stores nuclear material classified as Category I, it must be established in accordance with the physical security requirements for the vital area;

61.3.2. if the nuclear facility contains vital equipment or uses and stores nuclear material classified as Category II, it must be established in accordance with the physical security requirements for the inner area;

61.3.3. in cases other than those referred to in sub-clauses 61.3.1 and 61.3.2 of the Requirements, it must be established in accordance with the physical security requirements for the protected area;

61.4. in such a way that its equipment and physical security systems allow personnel to monitor the situation at all times in relation to the performance of security functions.

62. At least one person shall be present at all times at the security station with the authority to take decisions related to the organisation of the security functions or the actions of the response forces in the event of an attempted unauthorised entry or unauthorised access to a nuclear facility, an attempted unauthorised seizure and/or use of nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle materials or equipment ensuring the normal operation of a nuclear facility, other unlawful acts, and a threat to carry out such unlawful acts.

63. In a nuclear facility containing critical and/or vital equipment and/or nuclear material of category I and/or II, the license holder shall install a back-up security station subject to the requirements of clauses 61 and 62 of the Requirements.

64. Communication system:

64.1. The license holder shall install a communication system that shall:

64.1.1. enable the physical security system personnel of a nuclear facility to maintain reliable, uninterrupted two-way communication with the main security station and with each other during the performance of their duties;

64.1.2. ensure continuous two-way communication between the officer in charge of the security of the nuclear facility and the person responsible for the management of the nuclear facility;

64.1.3. ensure communication with the response force;

64.2. provide for an alternative means of communication in the event of the failure or otherwise inoperability of the primary means of communication. The primary and alternate connections must use different data transmission methods (e.g. wired and wireless).

65. Assessing the effectiveness of the physical security system of a nuclear facility:

65.1. an applicant applying for a licence referred to in Article 22(1)(2), (4) or (5) of the Law referred to in sub-clause 2.2 of the Requirements, or for a licence referred to in Article 22(1)(3) of the Law referred to in sub-clause 2.2 of the Requirement, upon submitting an application to obtain a licence referred to in Article 22(1)(2) of the Law, shall be obliged to carry out an assessment of the effectiveness of the entire physical security system installed at the nuclear facility, in accordance with the performance assessment programme prepared by the applicant or the license holder and previously submitted to the VATESI. The effectiveness assessment programme shall describe the chosen method of effectiveness assessment (e.g. expert assessment, table-top exercise assessment, tactical exercise assessment, or any other chosen method), the roles and responsibilities of the persons involved in the effectiveness assessment, the conditions for the development of the scenarios of the intruders' actions, which shall be submitted to the VATESI for approval at least 10 working days prior to the planned date of the effectiveness assessment and the criteria for the establishment of an effective physical security system;

65.2. The method for assessing the effectiveness of the physical security system and the scenarios for the actions of the perpetrators must be chosen in the light of the threat envisaged and must allow an assessment of the ability of the physical security system (technical and organizational measures, including actions by the protection and response forces) of the nuclear facility to meet its objectives of protecting the nuclear facility and the nuclear material contained therein from unauthorised seizure or hijacking and from other unlawful acts which would directly or indirectly pose a risk to human health and safety from ionising radiation. When assessing the effectiveness of a nuclear power plant's physical security system, it is mandatory to use a tactical exercise approach that allows for the assessment of the effectiveness of the tactical decision-making of the protection and response actors, the actions of the physical security personnel, and the interaction between the physical security actors in the event of a threat (in terms of the scenarios of the perpetrators' actions);

65.3. The Head of VATESI shall take a decision on the scenarios of the intruders' actions submitted in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause 65.1 of the Requirements within 4 working days from their receipt. The Head of VATESI shall take a decision to align the scenarios of the intruders' actions if they are consistent with the identified design basis threat and with the provisions of sub-clauses 65.1 and 65.2 of the Requirements. The decision taken by the Head of VATESI shall be notified in writing no later than 1 working day after the decision is taken;

65.4. periodic evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical security system of the nuclear facility shall be carried out at least every 3 years, as well as in the event of a change in the anticipated threat. The scenarios for the periodic assessment of efficiency shall be developed, agreed with VATESI and the decision of the Head of VATESI shall be taken in accordance with the procedures and under the conditions set out in sub-clauses 65.1, 65.2 and 65.3 of these Requirements;

65.5. Following an assessment of the effectiveness of the physical security system of a nuclear facility, an effectiveness assessment report shall be prepared;

65.6. In the event that the assessment of the effectiveness of the physical security system of a nuclear facility identifies vulnerabilities that could be exploited by intruders to commit an unlawful act, a vulnerability remediation plan shall be developed, which shall include measures to address the vulnerabilities and a timeframe for the implementation of those measures;

65.7. In the event that, during the assessment of the effectiveness of the physical security system of a nuclear facility, non-conformities with international recommendations or best practices (hereinafter referred to as "best practices") are identified, which do not directly create conditions for the intruders to commit an unlawful act, but which may have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the physical security system, the licence holder shall take a decision on the application of measures to address the non-conformities with identified best practices. Where the licence holder has decided to apply measures to address non-conformities in best practices, a plan to address the non-conformities in best practices shall be drawn up, which shall specify the corrective measures to be taken to address the non-conformities in best practices and the timeframe for the implementation of those measures;

65.8. A report on the evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical security system of a nuclear facility shall be submitted to VATESI. In the cases referred to in point 2.9 of the Law referred to in the requirements, as a document required for obtaining a licence or permit, and in other cases within 30 days after the assessment;

65.9. in the event that a plan for addressing the vulnerabilities has been developed in accordance with the procedure set out in sub-clause 65.6 of the Requirements, the plan shall be submitted to VATESI for its findings together with the report referred to in sub-clause 65.8 of the Requirements. VATESI shall, no later than 20 working days from the date of receipt of the plan of measures, provide its conclusions in writing as to whether the measures set out in the plan of measures prevent the identified vulnerabilities;

65.10. in the event that a plan for the elimination of best practices non-conformities has been prepared in accordance with the procedure set out in sub-clause 65.7 of the Requirements, it shall be submitted to VATESI for information together with the report referred to in sub-clause 65.8 of the Requirements.

66. Initial and continuing training of the license holder's personnel who are employees of the physical security system shall be organised and conducted in accordance with the procedures laid down in the Law referred to in point 2.17 of the Requirements.

SECTION 3

PHYSICAL SECURITY OF A NUCLEAR FACILITY AND THE SITE OF A NUCLEAR FACILITY WHERE DECOMMISSIONING WORK IS BEING CARRIED OUT

67. The requirements of this section shall apply to holders of licences referred to in Article 22(1)(4) of the Law referred to in sub-clause 2.2 of the Requirements.

68. A nuclear facility and a nuclear facility site where decommissioning work is being carried out and where the nuclear facility contains major or vital facilities or nuclear material of category I, II or III shall be subject to the requirements set out in Chapter VI, Section 2 of these Requirements to the full extent.

69. For a nuclear facility and a nuclear facility site where decommissioning work is being carried out and where the nuclear facility does not contain any major or vital facilities and no nuclear material of category I, II or III, the requirements set out in clauses 34 to 35, 46 to 47, 50 to 54, 56 to 62, 64 and 66 of these Requirements shall apply *mutatis mutandis*.

CHAPTER VII

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN THEIR ACQUISITION, POSSESSION AND USE

70. The requirements of this Section shall apply to the licence referred to in The Law referred to in point 2.2 of the requirements 22(1)(7).

71. Categories of nuclear material for physical security:

71.1. nuclear material shall be classified as nuclear material in accordance with the table of categories of nuclear material in Annex 2 to the Requirements;

71.2. it is recommended to refer to the document referred to in clause 2.18 of the Requirements for the determination of the category of nuclear material of different isotopes.

72. The license holder shall, in order to carry out the security functions set out in point 7 of the Requirements:

72.1. establish procedures for granting access to nuclear material and to ensure that access to nuclear material is limited to those who have such access. Other persons may have access to nuclear material only with the escort of a person authorised to have access to the nuclear material;

72.2. keep records of nuclear material and to verify periodically that all nuclear material in its possession and use is in the locations specified in the records. The frequency of inspections depends on the category of nuclear material. If it is suspected that unauthorised persons may have gained access to nuclear material or that nuclear material may have been illegally seized, abducted, used, transferred or lost, the inspection must be carried out immediately. Such an inspection must be initiated within 24 hours of the reasonable suspicion arising;

72.3. ensure that the area, building or premises where nuclear material is used and/or stored (hereinafter referred to as the storage site) or any openings (e.g. doors, windows) through which access to the storage site is possible, are equipped with means of detecting unlawful acts (e.g. burglar alarms, security alarms, seals, stamps, and/or other equipment that would detect a breach or other unlawful acts) or that the area around the site is patrolled for unlawful acts;

72.4. The number of points of access to the storage site shall not exceed the number of points of access necessary for the license holder's activities;

72.5. implement an access control system, consisting of organisational and technical measures, to ensure that only those persons authorised to enter and leave the storage area are admitted and discharged, recording the time of admission and discharge, the identity of the person admitted and discharged. These data must be kept for at least 18 months from the date of recording;

72.6. ensure that measures are taken to locate and recover missing or illegally seized nuclear material.

73. The license holder shall implement the provisions of clause 72 of the Requirements to ensure the physical security of nuclear material which is not included in the table of categories of nuclear material in Annex 2 to the Requirements, and nuclear material classified in Category III.

74. Category II nuclear material may only be used and stored in a facility that meets the requirements for the physical security of a nuclear facility set out in Chapter VI, Section 2 of the Requirements.

75. Category I nuclear material may only be used and stored in a facility that meets the requirements for the physical security of a nuclear facility as set out in Chapter VI, Section 2 of the Requirements.

76. Paragraph 72.2 of the requirements specifies the frequency of the inspection:

76.1. for nuclear material not included in the table of categories of nuclear material set out in Annex 2 to the Requirements and for nuclear material classified in categories III and II - at least once a month.

76.2. for nuclear material in Category I, at least once a day.

CHAPTER VIII REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE MATERIALS IN TRANSIT

77. The requirements of this Section shall apply to the licence referred to in the Law referred to in point 2.2 of the requirements 22(1)(6), to holders, Consignors and Consignees.

78. Physical security objectives for the carriage of cargo:

78.1. reduce the total time taken to transport the cargo;

78.2. reduce the number and time of load transfers, i.e. transfers between vehicles, transfers to and from temporary storage while waiting for an arriving vehicle;

78.3. protect the cargo during transport and in temporary storage areas, depending on the category of nuclear material transported;

78.4. avoid regular freight schedules;

78.5. reduce the number of persons with knowledge of the carriage of the cargo to the minimum necessary.

79. The licence holder shall ensure the physical security of the loads by:

79.1. installing a vehicle alarm system, access control system, communication system and containment system;

79.2. selecting primary and alternate routes, taking into account road safety, i.e. it shall plan routes in such a way as to avoid districts and/or areas where an emergency has occurred or is likely to occur. The routes chosen must be coordinated with the response force;

79.3. where stops for rest or overnight stays are necessary in the course of the carriage of the cargo, ensuring that, during such stops, the vehicle carrying the cargo of nuclear material is secured in a manner appropriate to the category of nuclear material carried. The requirements for the physical security of nuclear material in storage are set out in Chapter VII of the Requirements;

79.4. locking and sealing all doors and other openings in the cargo compartment or container of the vehicle through which access to the cargo compartment is possible;

79.5. allowing the Consignor to inspect the means of transport before loading and dispatch of the cargo;

79.6. upon delivery, allowing the Consignee to inspect the locks and seals for damage and hand over the delivered cargo to the Consignee immediately;

79.7. ensuring that the nuclear material cargo is accompanied by an armed escort;

79.8. to inform the Consignor and the Consignee of any change in the time of delivery of the cargo.

80. The Consignor shall:

80.1. inform the Consignee in advance of the intended carriage of the cargo, specifying the mode of carriage (road, rail, water and/or air) and the estimated time of arrival of the cargo;

80.2. carry out a thorough inspection of the means of transport before loading and dispatch of the cargo.

81. The Consignee of a nuclear cargo shall ensure the physical security of the cargo by the following means:

81.1. upon delivery, the license holder must check the locks and seals for damage and accept the cargo immediately;

81.2. it shall, upon receipt of the cargo, notify the sender of the arrival or non-arrival of the cargo after an agreed period of time has elapsed after the scheduled time of arrival.

82. The license holder, Consignor and Consignee shall ensure that information relating to cargo operations, including details of the timetable, route, means of transport, means of communication, armed escorts, response forces and defence planning in the event of an emergency and unlawful acts, is protected from disclosure where disclosure of such information would adversely affect the security functions performed. Such information may only be disclosed on the basis of the 'need-to-know' principle, i.e. where there is a need to have access to the protected information for the performance of the functions and/or task in question.

83. Ensuring the physical security of Category II nuclear material during transport, the following requirements apply:

83.1. the requirements set out in clauses 79 to 82 of the Requirements shall apply;

83.2. such materials must be transported in a closed vehicle, in locked cells or containers. Cargo weighing more than 2000 kg may be transported in an open vehicle, chained and sealed.

84. Ensuring the physical security of Category I nuclear material during transport, the following requirements shall apply:

84.1. the requirements set out in clauses 79 to 83 of the Requirements shall apply;

84.2. The Consignee must confirm his readiness to accept the cargo before the carriage of the cargo begins;

84.3. where cargo is transported by road, rail or water, a transport control centre must be installed in such a way as to enable it to carry out its functions uninterrupted, taking into account the design basis threat;

84.4. The transport control centre shall be manned by representatives of the Consignor and the Consignee, by an officer of the response force who shall be in charge of the armed escort, who shall monitor the location and physical security status of the cargo, who shall be able to call for the response

force in the event of an attack, and who shall be in constant two-way communication with the armed escort and the response force accompanying the cargo;

84.5. The armed escort accompanying the load must report by means of two-way communication to the transport control centre each overnight stop, the place of transfer of the load and the arrival at the destination;

84.6. following requirements shall apply, depending on the mode of transport:

84.6.1. Carriage of cargo by road:

84.6.1.1. the vehicle shall be selected and reinforced to take account of the anticipated threat and shall be designed for the carriage of the specific load;

84.6.1.2. the vehicle shall be equipped to prevent unauthorised access to the vehicle and to enable the vehicle to be located at any time;

84.6.1.3. There shall be two-way communication between the load and the armed escort vehicles and the transport control centre;

84.6.2. Carriage by rail freight:

84.6.2.1. cargo must be carried on a freight train and only on a carriage suitable for such cargo;

84.6.2.2. the armed escort accompanying the load must be in the carriage closest to the load;

84.6.3. Carriage by water must be carried only on a dedicated cargo vessel;

84.6.4. In the case of carriage by air, the cargo must be carried in a vehicle adapted for that purpose and must be the only cargo on board.

85. Physical security requirements not less than those specified in sub-clauses 78.1, 78.2, 78.3 and 78.5 of these Requirements shall apply to the carriage of cargo on the site of a nuclear facility.

86. In the case of international shipments of nuclear material:

86.1. The Consignor, the carrier and the Consignee must conclude an agreement clearly specifying the points of transfer of responsibility for physical security;

86.2. it must be ensured that the physical security requirements set out in Annex I to the Convention on the Physical Security of Nuclear Material are met along the entire route to be used for the transport of nuclear material. Commitments to implement this provision must be specified in the agreement referred to in point 86.1 of the Requirements.

CHAPTER IX FINAL PROVISIONS

87. The license holders and other persons ensuring and/or participating in ensuring the physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear facility sites, nuclear material and nuclear fuel cycle materials, in implementing the provisions of these Requirements relating to the processing of personal data, shall process personal data for the purposes of ensuring the physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear facility sites, nuclear material and nuclear fuel cycle materials, as well as for the purposes of prevention of unlawful acts, in accordance with the provisions of the Requirements, in accordance with the Laws referred to in sub-clauses 2.1 and 2.8 of these Requirements and other requirements for the processing and protection of personal data.

SIZE OF THE RESTRICTED AREAS FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Nuclear facility	Outer boundary of the restricted area (distance in metres from the perimeter of the nuclear facility's protected area)
Nuclear (atomic) power plant	
A nuclear power plant, other than a nuclear power plant undergoing decommissioning operations, which does not contain important or vital facilities or nuclear material of category I, II or III	3000
A nuclear power plant undergoing decommissioning operations and not containing any major or vital facilities or nuclear material of category I, II or III	500
Nuclear facility other than a nuclear power plant	
A nuclear facility, other than a nuclear facility where decommissioning work is being carried out and there are no important or vital facilities or nuclear material of category I, II or III, located in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, but not further than 10 km from the State border of the Republic of Lithuania	500
A nuclear facility undergoing decommissioning works and not containing important or vital facilities or nuclear material of category I, II or III, located in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, but not more than 10 km from the state border of the Republic of Lithuania	100
A nuclear facility, other than a nuclear facility undergoing decommissioning works, which does not contain important or vital facilities or nuclear material of category I, II or III, and which is located in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, more than 10 km from the state border of the Republic of Lithuania	100
A nuclear facility undergoing decommissioning works and not containing important or vital facilities or nuclear material of category I, II or III, located in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, more than 10 km from the state border of the Republic of Lithuania	25

Nuclear safety requirements
BSR-1.6.1-2025 "Physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear facility sites, nuclear material and nuclear fuel cycle materials"

Annex 2

CATEGORIES OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

Material	Form	Category		
		I	II	III
1. Plutonium ^{a)}	Not irradiated ^(b)	2 kg or more	Less than 2 kg but more than 500 g	500 g or less but more than 15 g
2. Uranium-235 (²³⁵ U)	Not irradiated ^(b) Uranium enriched in the isotope ²³⁵ U by 20 % or more	5 kg or more	Less than 5 kg but more than 1 kg	1 kg or less but more than 15 g
	Uranium enriched in the isotope ²³⁵ U between 10 % and 20 %.	-	10 kg or more	Less than 10 kg but more than 1 kg
	Uranium enriched in the isotope ²³⁵ U to a greater extent than natural uranium, but less than 10 %.	-	-	10 kg or more
3. Uranium-233 (²³³ U)	Not irradiated ^(b)	2 kg or more	Less than 2 kg but more than 500 g	500 g or less but more than 15 g
4. Irradiated (spent) nuclear fuel ^(c)			Depleted or natural uranium, thorium or low enriched fuel (less than 10 % fissile isotopes) ^(c)	

^(a) All plutonium except plutonium with a concentration of more than 80 per cent of the plutonium 238 isotope.

^(b) Nuclear material not irradiated in a nuclear reactor or nuclear material irradiated in a nuclear reactor that emits ionising radiation at a distance of one metre without shielding at a dose rate of one gray per hour (1 Gy/hour) or less.

^(c) Spent nuclear fuel or nuclear material irradiated in a nuclear reactor, which before irradiation was classified as Category I or II, depending on the amount of fissile isotopes, may be downgraded by one step (to Category II or III, as appropriate), in agreement with the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (hereinafter referred to as "VATESI"), if the dose rate of ionising radiation emitted by the material at a distance of one metre is greater than 1 Gy/hr when not in the shielding. (100 rad/hr). A request for downgrading shall be accompanied by documentation to the VATESA justifying that the materials meet the condition referred to in this point. The decision on the approval shall be taken by the Head of VATESI within the time limit set out in sub-clause 2.2 of Article 34(2) of Article 34(2) of the legal act referred to in Article 34(2) of the Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.6.1-2025 "Physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear facility sites, nuclear material and nuclear fuel cycle materials". VATESI shall not reconcile this request if the justification provided in it does not comply with the condition and/or objective circumstances (factual situation) referred to in this point.

TYPICAL CONTENT OF A PROTECTION AREA ZONING ANALYSIS OF A NUCLEAR FACILITY

1. Introduction.
 2. Description of the nuclear facility. This section provides information on the site, the structures on the site, the activities carried out on the site, the nuclear and other radioactive material and the safety-vital systems.
 3. Criteria for the division of a nuclear facility into protection areas and a description of the expected threat.
 4. Assessing the potential for theft and its consequences. This section provides information on potential theft scenarios and an assessment of their consequences.
 5. Assessing the potential and consequences of damage to safety-vital structures, systems and components. This chapter provides information on all potential initial external and internal events that could potentially occur as a result of unlawful human activity and that could lead, directly or indirectly, to an increase in the annual effective dose to the public and/or workers.
 6. Identification of important and vital facilities. This section provides an assessment of the perpetrators identified in the Threat Document and their potential to damage the safety vital structures, systems and components that should identify the offending equipment as vital or vital.
 7. Determining the protection areas of a nuclear facility. This section summarises information on nuclear and other radioactive material, identified vital and/or important facilities.
 8. Conclusions.
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