

NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY IN LITHUANIA



ANNUAL
REPORT
2025

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Foreword by the Head of VATESI

In 2025, there were no events in Lithuanian nuclear facilities or activities involving nuclear and nuclear fuel cycle materials that might have any impact on nuclear safety. State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (Ignalina NPP) recorded one unusual event reportable in its operations that was classified below the scale threshold at level 0 on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES), with no damage to radionuclide containment and/or radiation suppression barriers, the levels of occupational exposure and indoor radionuclide contamination that stayed within the established permissible limits, and there were no radionuclide releases into the environment. The low level of unusual events and the fact that they had no impact on safety indicate a high level of nuclear safety at the Ignalina NPP and other nuclear facilities in Lithuania. Similarly, other undertakings operating in the ionising radiation environment at nuclear power facilities and holders of small quantities of nuclear material have also ensured a high level of safety in their activities.

As work intensified on decommissioning and radioactive waste management projects of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, radiological monitoring results showed that the activity levels of radionuclides released into the environment did not exceed the established limits, and the work was carried out safely.

The strong annual results demonstrate that economic entities active in the Lithuania's nuclear energy sector are making efforts to identify solutions that help manage risks arising from the operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities, ensuring that the public and the environment are adequately protected.

The continued public concern and attention to Ukraine due to the serious situation at nuclear facilities, in particular at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, has also required constant monitoring and assessment of the situation. Providing verified and reliable information and responding in a timely manner to the public's need for information has been, and continues to be, one of the emergency preparedness functions consistently carried out by VATESI.




Strengthening nuclear safety in Europe through participation in topical peer reviews also serves as an instrument for identifying and addressing relevant issues. In 2025, the peer review of fire safety at nuclear installations was completed. The overall conclusion of the review confirmed that different approaches and solutions are applied across EU countries to address fire hazards, and no significant deficiencies were identified in the fire safety strategies of the installations assessed, demonstrating that the overall framework is coherent. Effective management of fire load and ignition sources, strong leadership, accountability, and a robust safety culture were also identified as key factors contributing to the reduction of fire risk. We will consistently apply this experience in the supervision and assessment of the safety of Lithuania's nuclear facilities.

The priorities of VATESI activities remain the same in the short term: to supervise the safety of Ignalina NPP's decommissioning activities and radioactive waste management, to supervise the compliance with international non-proliferation commitments undertaken by the Republic of Lithuania, to consistently improve the framework of nuclear safety regulation and supervision, and to be prepared for potential nuclear and radiological emergencies in Lithuania and beyond.

A stylized signature in blue ink, consisting of several fluid, connected strokes.

Head of VATESI
Michail Demčenko



Nuclear facilities in Lithuania

1. Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant – Drūkšiniai, Visaginas m.
2. Closed Maišiagala storage facility of radioactive waste – Bartkuškis forest, Širvintos.
3. Spent nuclear fuel storage facility (SFSF-1) – Drūkšiniai, Visaginas m.
4. Spent nuclear fuel storage facility (SFSF-2) – Drūkšiniai, Visaginas m.
5. Very low level waste buffer storage facility – Drūkšiniai, Visaginas m.
6. Cemented radioactive waste storage facility – Drūkšiniai, Visaginas m.
7. Facilities for treatment and storage of solid radioactive waste – Drūkšiniai, Visaginas m.
8. Solid radioactive waste retrieval facilities – Drūkšiniai, Visaginas m.
9. Very low level radioactive waste repository – Drūkšiniai, Visaginas m.

Nuclear facilities under construction

Low and intermediate level radioactive waste repository – Stabatiškės, Visaginas m.

STATE NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY INSPECTORATE



State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate

The State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) is a State regulatory and supervisory authority for safety in the nuclear field, activities involving nuclear material, and other activities in the nuclear field involving sources of ionising radiation. VATESI sets forth safety regulations and requirements, supervises compliance with them, issues licenses and permits, assesses nuclear facilities for safety, conducts inspections, and carries out other functions.

Within its remit, VATESI ensures compliance with the commitments of the Republic of Lithuania established in international agreements, and represents the national interests in international organisations.

VATESI is an independent public body established in 1991. Its activities are financed by the appropriations of the Lithuanian State budget and by other legally generated revenue.

VATESI is headed by the Head of VATESI appointed by the President of the Republic of Lithuania based on a recommendation from the Prime Minister. Deputy Heads are appointed by the Prime Minister on a recommendation from the Head of VATESI.

VATESI vision

The public and the environment are reliably protected in accordance with the highest and modern safety standards.

Nuclear safety regulation is explicit and prudent.

Work at VATESI is highly respected, valued and motivating.

VATESI mission is to perform the State regulation and supervision of safety of nuclear facilities and activities related to nuclear and nuclear fuel cycle materials in order to protect the public and the environment from the harmful effects of radiation.

The main activity priorities of VATESI are as follows:

- To supervise safety of the decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP;
- To supervise safety of construction and operation of radioactive waste management facilities;
- To ensure the supervision of compliance with the international non-proliferation obligations undertaken by the Republic of Lithuania;
- To improve the regulatory and supervisory framework of nuclear safety in Lithuania;
- To assess, within its remits, the compliance of nuclear power plants in neighbouring countries with international safety standards;
- To prepare, within its remits, for nuclear and radiological emergencies that may occur in Lithuania and abroad.

Key activities completed in 2025

In 2025, the following key activities were completed:

- Carrying out licensing in the field of nuclear power activities and activities in this field involving sources of ionising radiation and making decisions on granting, amending or withdrawal of licenses, permits or temporary permits;
- Analysis and assessment of safety justification documents and other safety-relevant documentation;
- Supervision of the safety of the decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP;
- Supervision of the safety of the decommissioning of the Maišiagala Radioactive Waste Storage Facility (Maišiagala RWSF);
- Supervision of the safety of the operation of spent nuclear fuel facilities;
- Supervision of the safety of the construction and operation of radioactive waste management facilities;
- Supervision of the nuclear facilities (NF) and nuclear material physical security;

State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI)

VALUES

TRANSPARENCY

INTEGRITY AND IMPARTIALITY

OPENNESS TO CHANGE

COMPETENCE

COOPERATION

RESPONSIBILITY


VISION

WORK AT VATESI
highly respected, valued and motivating

NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATION
explicit and prudent

PUBLIC AND THE ENVIRONMENT
reliably protected in accordance with the highest and modern safety standards

Nuclear and radiation safety regulatory infrastructure in Lithuania



- Supervision of economic entities holding licenses and permits;
- Supervision of compliance with international nuclear non-proliferation obligations undertaken by the Republic of Lithuania;
- Compliance with international obligations, preparation and submission of reports;
- Management of State information resources under the competence of VATESI;
- Drafting of legal acts regulating nuclear power safety;
- Consulting of economic entities and public authorities;
- Assessment of the safety of nuclear power plants in neighbouring countries;
- Preparation for potential nuclear and radiological emergencies that may occur in Lithuania and abroad.

VATESI's objectives and achieved targets

The performance goal of VATESI's activities is to aim to ensure a high level of nuclear safety in Lithuania through State regulation and supervision.

To achieve the above-mentioned performance goal, two effect criteria were set and achieved in 2025:

- There were no unusual events of Level 2 and higher according to the INES in Lithuania's nuclear facilities (target value – 0);
- There were no cases of use of nuclear material, nuclear dual-use items and undeclared research and development related to the nuclear fuel cycle in Lithuania for non-peaceful purposes (target value – 0).

In 2025, within the framework of the Programme of Nuclear Safety Regulation and Supervision, VATESI successfully implemented four follow-up action objectives:

- To authorise and supervise activities within the supervision area delegated to VATESI;
- To improve the regulatory and supervisory framework for nuclear safety;
- To assess the compliance of nuclear power plants in neighbouring countries with international safety standards and prepare for possible nuclear and radiological accidents there;
- To ensure the operation of VATESI.

In 2025, within the framework of the Programme of Nuclear Safety Regulation and Supervision, VATESI largely met all the target values for the monitoring indicators:

- There were no INES Level 1 events related to deficiencies based on the defence-in-depth principle (target value 1 or less);

- There were no INES Level 1 events related to radionuclide discharges and radiation exposure (target value 1 or less);
- There were no INES Level 1 events related to nuclear safety incidents (target value 1 or less);
- 100% of decisions on applications to obtain, amend, suspend or withdraw a licence, permit or temporary permit were taken within the statutory time limits (target value 100%);
- 100% of safety justification documents and other safety-relevant documents were duly reviewed and evaluated (target value 100%);
- 100% of the inspections foreseen in the annual inspection plan were carried out (target value 100%);
- 100% of violations were rectified within the time-frame specified in the documentation for the application of sanctions (target value 100%);
- 99% of conclusions, reports, declarations or other information in the field of nuclear non-proliferation were timely prepared and submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Commission and the Ministry of the Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania (target value 100%);
- Access to all VATESI information systems by VATESI staff involved in the state supervision of nuclear energy safety was ensured at 98% (target value 96%);
- There were no non-compliances of nuclear safety legislation with international treaties, European Union and Lithuanian legislation (target value 0);
- 100% completion of the work set out in the Annual Plan for the Drafting and Review of Nuclear Safety Normative Technical Documents (target value 100%);
- 100% provision of consultation to economic entities on time (target value 100%);
- 100% of conclusions on the assessment of the information received on the safety performance of nuclear power plants in neighbouring countries were prepared to a high standard and submitted to the Lithuanian authorities on time (target value 100%);
- 100% assessment of the safety justification documents of nuclear power plants in neighbouring countries (target value 100%);
- The functioning of the Early Notification System was ensured at 100% (target value 100%);
- No confirmed reports on non-compliances from stakeholders to whom VATESI provides administrative services (target value 0);
- No cases of misuse of budget funds allocated to VATESI were identified by the authorities controlling the use of funds (target value 0);

VATESI 2025 in numbers

VATESI staff members	55
Inspected economic entities	41
Licences and permits in the supervised area of radiation protection	31
Holders of supervised nuclear material	13
Violations detected and eliminated	18
Level 1 and higher events according to INES	0
Licences and permits in the supervised area of nuclear safety	27
Consultations provided (verbal)	111

- 96.43% of VATESI staff participated in qualification improvement activities (target value 85%);
- Low-value public procurement carried out through the Central Public Procurement Information System and the Central Contracting Authority's catalogue accounted for 25.3% of the total value of low-value public procurement (target value 25%).

Key events in 2025

27 February – VATESI accepted the application of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant for a permit to carry out the dismantling of the steam drum-separators of both reactor units and approved the schedule for submission of the documents required for the safety assessment.

17-28 March – At the Review Meeting of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management held in Vienna, Lithuania's national report was presented, and it was confirmed that Lithuania is properly fulfilling its obligations under the Joint Convention.

24-25 June – VATESI professionals, together with other Lithuanian institutions, participated in the IAEA-organised ConvEx-3 international emergency preparedness exercise, which tested preparedness to respond to nuclear emergencies with potential transboundary effects.

30 June – VATESI issued a permit to Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant for the industrial operation of the very low level radioactive waste repository constructed near the Ignalina NPP site in Visaginas Municipality.

29 August – VATESI submitted Lithuania's 10th national report on the implementation of its obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety to the IAEA; this was Lithuania's first report as a country without nuclear installations under the provisions of the Convention.

October – Representatives of VATESI and the Radiation Protection Centre (RPC) visited Visaginas, Zarasai and Ignalina, where they presented information on the radiological impact of nuclear facilities on residents and the environment and answered questions of concern to local communities.


21-22 October – A preparatory meeting for the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission was held in Vilnius.

17 December – VATESI issued a permit to Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant to carry out the dismantling and decontamination of the steam drum-separators of both reactor units in accordance with the approved engineering design.


Stakeholders' assessment of VATESI's activities

Stakeholders opinion survey 2025


VATESI consultations



VATESI activities



VATESI interinstitutional cooperation and partnership




VATESI's preparedness to perform civil protection functions

Civil protection is an activity that covers the preparedness of government and local authorities and agencies, other institutions, economic entities, non-governmental organisations, residents and other persons for emergencies, as well as actions taken when they are at risk of occurring or have occurred, and emergency management and mitigation of the consequences. Civil protection in Lithuania is regulated by the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection that establishes the

LITHUANIA

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legal framework for crisis and emergency prevention, crisis and emergency preparedness, as well as management and mitigation of the consequences thereof.

In the event of an imminent or actual nuclear accident or radiological emergency in Lithuania or in the neighbouring countries, where there is a threat of radioactive material entering the territory of the country, the situation shall be managed in line with the National Plan for Protection of Population in Case of Nuclear or Radiological Accident (hereinafter referred to as “the Plan”). The Plan establishes civil protection measures for arranging and implementing protective actions to protect the population, the property of the population and the environment from ionising radiation and radioactive contamination, regulates arrangements for national level emergency management in case of an imminent or actual emergency, as well as the functions of the government and local authorities and agencies, other institutions and economic entities in this field. In compliance with the Plan, VATESI assesses the situation and forecasts the course of a nuclear or radiological accident at NFs, carries out an assessment of the radionuclides released to the environment in the event of an accident and of the radionuclide activity, and provides information to national authorities, the European Commission, the IAEA, and the neighbouring countries.

The Plan is regularly tested during exercises and updated as necessary to improve and practice the skills of the members of the civil protection system in order to perform the delegated functions. Members of the VATESI Emergency Operations Centre must be prepared to respond to nuclear and radiological accidents, and therefore regularly participate in trainings, exercises and communication drills on various levels.

In 2025, the members of the Centre attended two international-level exercises, one interdepartmental and four international communication drills. They also enhanced their qualifications during emergency preparedness and civil protection trainings organised by VATESI, civil protection training organised by the Fire Fighters Training School of the Fire and Rescue Department, as well as during IAEA trainings.

Correspondence with the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Belarus on safety issues related to the Belarusian NPP also continued in 2025. After receiving incomplete answers, conclusions and information for Lithuanian authorities and the public at large were prepared.

Belarus has not provided specific information on the choice of the location for the construction of the NPP, as in the event of an accident about 1/3 of the Lithuanian population may be exposed to ionising radiation, and it would be extremely difficult for the responsible authorities in our country to manage the consequences of a possible accident in such circumstances. To adequately protect the population and provide them with relevant data,



Work at the VATESI Emergency Operations Centre during the exercise

information on unplanned outages of the Belarusian NPP was assessed, the level of emergency preparedness of the institution was strengthened, and the interaction with other responsible authorities was enhanced.

In 2025, VATESI implemented measures foreseen in the Emergency Prevention Plan 2022-2025 for 2025 to prevent the risk of fire, infectious diseases, disruption and/or failures of electronic communications and/or communication systems, including those caused by cyber-attacks, heat supply disruptions and/or failures during the heating season, as well as measures to prepare for emergency situations related to nuclear accidents.

Changes in nuclear safety regulation

Clear and consistent legal regulation that responds to changes in the threat profile of nuclear energy activities is a key prerequisite for an adequate nuclear safety assurance system.

As part of its efforts to properly plan the process of drafting legislation, VATESI prepares a 5-year Programme for the Improvement of Nuclear Safety Normative Technical Documents and an Annual Plan for the Drafting and Review of Nuclear Safety Normative Technical Documents.

The number of safety requirements adopted and amended in 2025 by the area of supervision:

Radioactive waste management	1
Physical security	2
Radiation protection	1
Transportation of nuclear, fission, and nuclear fuel cycle materials	1

LICENSING OF ACTIVITIES OF ECONOMIC ENTITIES



Licensing of activities of economic entities

Licensing of activities of economic entities

VATESI supervised the following activities of holders of VATESI licences, permits and certificates:

1. Activities of the **Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant** in accordance with the conditions of the licences, permits and certificates issued by VATESI:
 - construction of a radioactive waste repository for the storage of intermediate-level radioactive waste;
 - operation of a radioactive waste repository for the storage of low-level radioactive waste and testing of the repository for the import and use of radioactive waste, prior to the commencement of industrial operation of the repository;
 - industrial operation of the repository for the storage of low-level radioactive waste;
 - operation of the following spent fuel and radioactive waste storage facilities: two spent fuel storage facilities, a solid radioactive waste storage facility, a solid radioactive waste treatment facility, a cemented liquid radioactive waste storage facility and a cementing facility, a bituminised radioactive waste storage facility and storage tanks for liquid radioactive waste, and the operation of the two solid radioactive waste storage facilities that were filled during the lifetime of the Ignalina NPP;
 - decommissioning of the Maišiagala radioactive waste storage facility;
 - decommissioning of the following nuclear facilities located on the Ignalina NPP's site: Ignalina NPP's Units 1 and 2, the radioactive waste bituminisation plant, and the storage facility for unspent nuclear fuel;
 - decontamination and/or dismantling of Ignalina NPP's structures, systems and components contaminated with radionuclides, in accordance with permits issued by VATESI;
 - transportation of radioactive waste existing at the Maišiagala radioactive waste storage facility and generated during its decommissioning, in accordance with the licence issued by VATESI for the transportation of nuclear fuel cycle material and nuclear and fissile materials listed in Annex 1 to the Law on Nuclear Safety of the Republic of Lithuania, in the quantities specified therein, as well as preparations for the transportation within the Republic of

Lithuania of orphaned nuclear fuel cycle material, nuclear and fissile material, whether orphaned or from other generators, in the prescribed quantities.

2. Activities of **31 economic entities** (including the Ignalina NPP) under licences for activities involving sources of ionising radiation or activities in ionising radiation environment in the field of nuclear energy, valid as of 31 December 2025, issued by VATESI in accordance with the Law on Radiation Protection to undertakings carrying out work within the controlled area of the Ignalina NPP site.
3. Activities of the **State Research Institute Centre for Physical Sciences and Technology**, using sealed sources of ionising radiation with nuclear material under the licence issued by VATESI to acquire, possess and use the specified nuclear and fissile material in the quantities set out in Annex 1 to the Law on Nuclear Safety.
4. In the area of nuclear non-proliferation, in addition to the Ignalina NPP and the Centre for Physical Sciences and Technology, VATESI also supervises **three economic entities** holding nuclear material and assigned a material balance area code by the European Commission, but not required to hold the licence referred to in Article 22(1) of the Law on Nuclear Safety, as well as four economic entities holding nuclear material and accounting for it within a VATESI material balance area, but likewise not required to hold the licence referred to in Article 22(1) of the Law on Nuclear Safety.

Applications for licences and permits examined by VATESI

In 2025, VATESI examined a total of 28 applications: six applications for licences and permits provided for in the Law on Nuclear Safety of the Republic of Lithuania, one application for a permit provided for in the Law on Radiation Protection of the Republic of Lithuania, and 21 applications for renewal or revocation of licences referred to in the Law on Radiation Protection.

The following applications submitted by the Ignalina NPP for licences and permits referred to in the Law on Nuclear Safety were examined:

- one application for a permit to commence industrial operation of the Very Low Level Radioactive Waste Repository;
- one application for a licence to construct and operate the bituminised radioactive waste storage facility;
- four applications for permits to carry out the decontamination and dismantling of radionuclide-contaminated equipment at the Ignalina NPP (equipment from reactor working areas R1 and R2 in Unit 2, the steam drum-separators in Units 1 and 2, equipment from the low-salinity water storage tanks in Unit 2, and equipment from the B1 buildings in Unit 1).

In 2025, VATESI examined one application for a radioactive material transportation permit provided for in Article 30(1) of the Law on Radiation Protection of the Republic of Lithuania (on 19 November 2025, Permit No. 43.4-1 was issued to the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant for the export of radionuclide-contaminated video surveillance cameras (14 units) from the central halls, spent fuel pool halls, and transport corridors of the Ignalina NPP power units for return to the International Atomic Energy Agency).

In addition, VATESI examined and approved one application for a permit for shipments of radioactive materials classified as nuclear material, for which transportation permits are issued by the Radiation Protection Centre.

In 2025, VATESI took a total of 26 decisions on the issuance, withdrawal or renewal of licences and permits: one permit issued to commence industrial operation of a nuclear facility, two permits issued for carrying out the dismantling of the Ignalina NPP, one application approved for a transportation permit, and one permit issued for the transportation of radioactive materials provided for in Article 30(1) of the Law on Radiation Protection of the Republic of Lithuania. In addition, VATESI withdrew three licences and amended annexes to 18 licences as part of its supervision of nuclear energy practices involving sources of ionising radiation.

No violations were identified during the supervision processes related to authorised activities and activities regulated by permits in 2025.

Three licences for activities involving sources of ionising radiation in the field of nuclear energy were withdrawn following requests submitted by economic entities that had decided to discontinue the authorised activities.

Information contained in regularly updated lists of licenses, permits, temporary permits or certificates of registered activities issued by VATESI is available in the Services section of the website vatesi.lrv.lt.

Supervision of economic entities

Inspections

VATESI inspects economic entities in the areas of nuclear safety, radiation protection and physical security, and in the areas relating to compliance with requirements arising from the international non-proliferation commitments of the Republic of Lithuania.

The inspections are aimed at verifying the compliance of the activities carried out or planned to be carried out by economic entities with legislation and normative technical documents applicable to nuclear safety.

To efficiently use financial and human resources, VATESI follows the graded approach in inspecting activities of economic entity, i.e., the focus is on safety-related areas potentially posing higher risks to the population, the environment and the employees of the supervised entities, while aiming to prevent unreasonable burden on them. Inspection areas are selected after assessing the aspects directly related to risks: the amount, composition and physical state of radionuclides at NFs or their individual installations, the possibility of dispersal of these radionuclides and their potential impact on the employees, population and the environment, the risk of disintegration of physical safety barriers that contain radionuclides, the accessibility of nuclear or other radioactive material, as well as the number of employees or population that may be adversely affected by the activities of the economic entity and/or malfunctioning of the NF or its individual installations.

Inspections of economic entities carried out by VATESI staff are planned and performed in accordance with the principles of supervision of the activities of economic entities as laid down in the Law on Public Administration of the Republic of Lithuania and other provisions regulating supervision of economic entities.


To plan systematically the inspections of economic entities and the resources allocated to them, at the end of 2025, VATESI developed the Inspection Programme for 2026–2030. The Programme takes into account the planned applications of economic entities regarding licenses or permits, as well as activities undertaken or planned by them, for instance dismantling and modifications of equipment.

Each year, the annual VATESI Inspection Plan is developed on the basis of the Inspection Programme, which forms the basis for planned inspections.

In terms of planning aspects, VATESI inspections are classified into planned and unplanned inspections.

In 2025, a total of 41 inspections were carried out (56 in 2024), of which 33 were planned inspections, seven targeted inspections and one technical inspection.

Number of inspections completed by VATESI employees in 2020–2025



The highest number of inspections was conducted at the Ignalina NPP – 35 (43 in 2024). The main focus of these inspections was to assess how important to safety structures, systems and components of the permanently shut down units were maintained, how safety requirements during the dismantling and decontamination of redundant installations in Units 1 and 2, as well as in performing radioactive waste management works, were implemented, how physical security, radiation safety, fire protection, cyber security and emergency preparedness were ensured for nuclear facilities and nuclear and other radioactive materials, how non-proliferation commitments were complied with, how staff training was implemented, and how the competence of the staff was ensured.

In 2025, VATESI staff carried out one technical inspection focused on how technical inspections of important to safety pressure components were performed and how the technical condition of the equipment being inspected was assessed. This inspection included checks on the hydraulic testing of important to safety pressure components and the evaporator. The technical inspection carried out in 2025 did not reveal any irregularities or non-compliances with good practice.

In 2025, VATESI employees inspected the following entities once:

- Radiation Protection Centre and Polimaster Europe, UAB, were inspected for the taking of physical inventories of nuclear material kept there;
- Shindler liftas, UAB, Nau UAB, Elbalt UAB, and You&Expert UAB were inspected for the compliance with radiation protection requirements in the field of activities in ionising radiation environments;

27 VATESI employees participated in carrying out the inspections. The average inspection duration was four hours (four hours in 2024), taking into account the time spent by inspectors at the inspected facilities and the time spent in contact with the responsible personnel of the economic entities for inspection purposes.

In 2025, inspections identified 18 violations (13 in 2024) and five minor infringements of legal

requirements (hereinafter – “minor infringements”) (five in 2024), and one non-compliance with good practice. Additional three violations were identified following a review of safety justification documents and during the ongoing supervision of nuclear facilities. 20 violations detected were subject to sanctions, i.e. binding instructions. Three minor infringements were subject to instructions to eliminate the minor infringements. The remaining violations and minor infringements were rectified at the time of inspections or drafting the inspection reports and therefore did not lead to the imposition of sanctions. The violations were related to non-compliance with legal provisions requiring economic entities to establish procedures for the implementation of certain processes and to follow their management systems or non-compliance with obligations specified in other standard technical documents. The violations were in the supervised areas of safety assessment, managements systems, radioactive waste management, physical security, and other areas. Having rectified the violations identified in the inspection report or questionnaire/checklist, economic entities informed VATESI, providing supporting documentary proof. The violations/infringements detected in 2025 were rectified by the economic entities in a timely and proper manner.

VATESI staff continuously analyse the experience, knowledge and information gained from inspections, seminars and workshops, and provide proposals to improve the inspection practices and the documents governing them.

Practices in other countries in inspecting activities in the field of nuclear energy are shared during internships and training courses. The knowledge gained is applied when conducting inspections of economic entities’ activities.



During inspection

Since 2018, VATESI has participated in the progress assessment ("scoreboard") of supervisory authorities overseeing the activities of economic entities, conducted by the Ministry of the Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania, the main objective of which is to improve the business supervision system in Lithuania to ensure that supervision does not impose an unreasonable burden on economic entities. At the end of 2025, the results of the 2024 assessment of supervisory authorities were published, with VATESI achieving a progress index score of 9.44, ranking 4th among 44 institutions.

Having evaluated the recommendations provided by the Ministry of the Economy and Innovation, VATESI continues to improve the supervision of economic entities through the implementation of advanced business supervision measures.

Maintenance of operating important to safety structures, systems and components

The objective of the maintenance of important to safety structures, systems and components of NFs carried out by the staff of the State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant is to ensure that the facilities located in the NF operate reliably and safely. In line with the VATESI nuclear safety requirements, the Ignalina NPP is required to annually plan and carry out maintenance of important to safety structures, systems and components. Each year, the Ignalina NPP submits an annual safety report to VATESI, which contains summarised information on the maintenance work carried out by the Technical Support Division of the Ignalina NPP in accordance with the approved plans and schedules. During the inspections in 2025, VATESI inspected the condition of important to safety installations, assessed whether the results of the technical inspections were properly documented in the reports, work performance sheets, operational staff logbooks, and entered in the special information system on the maintenance works carried out.

In 2025, VATESI professionals reviewed the technological operating regulations for spent fuel and radioactive waste storage facilities, provided comments on them, and approved them. They also analysed and commented on the list of important to safety systems in Units 1 and 2 and common plant facilities, approved the list of important to safety structures, systems and components of the NF for which ageing management is required, as well as the updated list of lifting installations and their equipment.

During the inspections and the review of the reports, VATESI professionals assessed the results of maintenance work and provided their conclusions. They also inspected and evaluated the maintenance of important to

safety structures, systems and components, including important to safety lifting installations and their equipment, instrumentation and control (industrial electronics and automation), carried out at the solid radioactive waste retrieval, processing and storage facilities, the spent nuclear fuel storage facilities, the short-lived very low level radioactive waste storage facility, the bituminised radioactive waste storage facility, free-release measurement facilities, and Units 1 and 2 in the process of being dismantled. The inspections also assessed whether their repairs were carried out in a timely manner, whether remaining useful life assessments were conducted, whether assessments of their technical condition at the end of their design life were carried out in a timely manner, and whether decisions were taken to extend their operational life. In assessing how the entity ensures compliance with safety requirements in the maintenance of NF structures and their structural components important to safety, inspections covered Units 1 and 2, the Spent Fuel Storage Facility, the Solid Radioactive Waste Retrieval and Pre-Treatment Facility, and the radioactive waste storage facilities.

In summary, the entity pays due attention to the maintenance of important to safety equipment to ensure that it operates reliably and safely.

Supervision of decommissioning activities

In 2025, VATESI reviewed technological designs and safety analysis reports for the dismantling and decontamination of low salt water tanks (Structures 152/2A, 152/2B) and drum-separators of both reactor units, and, in June and December 2025, issued permits for the dismantling and decontamination of the equipment above. Safety justification for the radioactive waste pre-treatment site in Unit A1 was approved by VATESI in January 2025.

In 2025, the Ignalina NPP submitted conceptual designs and gap analysis reports for the dismantling of the reactor cores (R3 zones) in Units 1 and 2. VATESI provided its comments, as these conceptual designs will serve as the basis for further developing the reactor core decommissioning designs for both power units.

In 2025, VATESI reviewed and approved safety justification documents for the dismantling and decontamination of equipment (main circulation pumps, pressure and suction headers and their auxiliary systems, drum-separator pipelines, and hot spots in Units A1 and A2), dismantling and decontamination designs for equipment in Unit 2, steam-water lines and reactor bottom feed water lines (R1 and R2 working areas), well as their safety analysis reports for compliance with the requirements of nuclear safety, radiation protection and physical security.

The dismantling and decontamination designs for process water treatment equipment (Unit B1) in Unit 1 and their safety analysis reports were approved in May



Inspection of the repository for low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste under construction

2025. A permit to carry out the activities under this design will be issued following approval of the environmental impact assessment report for the decommissioning of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant.

In preparation for the demolition of disused and no longer needed structures on the territory of the Ignalina NPP, radiological surveys are being carried out to demonstrate that the activity concentrations of radionuclides in these structures and the surrounding area do not exceed clearance levels and surface activity limits. During 2025, historical assessments were reviewed for 13 structures and equipment, justifying that the structures, equipment and surrounding areas could not have been affected by radioactive contamination. Furthermore, the radiological survey programme, the final radiological survey report and the radiological verification surveys conducted for one structure confirmed that the radionuclide activity concentrations in the structure do not exceed clearance levels and surface activity limits for clearance.

Dismantling of equipment not needed any more at the Ignalina NPP is carried out in accordance with individually pre-developed and pre-approved projects, and is subject to inspections to assess the results.

Supervision of demolition of cleared buildings

Buildings and engineering structures on the site of the Ignalina NPP where activities with nuclear fuel cycle materials are planned or carried out, or which are considered to be affected by radionuclides, as well as buildings and/or engineering structures where one of the purposes of the building and/or equipment is to

ensure the nuclear safety, radiation protection and/or physical security of the NF, shall be considered NF structures. When planning to demolish cleared buildings, the Ignalina NPP shall demonstrate in the safety justification documents that there are no planned and ongoing activities with nuclear fuel cycle materials, that the buildings and the equipment therein are not designed to ensure nuclear safety, radiation protection and physical security, and that the buildings are free of equipment, systems and components that will be used and/or necessary for the decommissioning of the facility, that the activity concentrations of radionuclides in the buildings do not exceed clearance levels or surface activity values for free release, that the demolition works will have no adverse effect on other activities carried out on the site in terms of nuclear safety, radiation protection and physical security, including effects on the safe operation of the installations on the same site.


In 2025, VATESI examined 10 safety justification documents in which the Ignalina NPP substantiated that the NF structures can be considered as non-nuclear facility structures and demolished.

Supervision of occupational radiation protection

Occupational radiation protection was supervised by conducting inspections and analysing documents submitted on the implementation of radiation protection requirements.

In 2025, the collective dose of Ignalina NPP staff and outside workers was 757.07 man mSv (Ignalina NPP staff – 756.57 man mSv; outside workers – 0.5 man mSv). Compared with 2012–2024, the collective dose in 2025 decreased to roughly the same level as the collective dose recorded in 2019–2023. This change was primarily driven by a decrease in the collective dose from radioactive waste management.

Annual collective doses of Ignalina NPP staff and outside workers (OW) (man mSv) in 2012–2025



In 2025, 1,784 employees of the Ignalina NPP and outside workers were monitored for their individual exposure. The maximum annual individual dose to an employee of the Ignalina NPP was 11.02 mSv and the maximum annual individual dose to an outside worker was 0.09 mSv. The annual doses of Ignalina NPP staff and outside workers did not exceed the annual effective dose limit of 20 mSv set in the Lithuanian Hygiene Standard HN 73:2018.

Operational experience feedback

To ensure a high level of nuclear safety in Lithuania and to prevent potential accidents, incidents and unusual events important for nuclear safety, radiation safety and physical security, the operational experience of our own and of other organisations operating in the nuclear energy sector (hereinafter – “operational experience”) is continuously analysed. In 2025, the safety of the Ignalina NPP was continuously improved and ensured through the analysis of its own experience and that of other organisations operating in the nuclear energy sector.

In 2025, one unusual event was registered in the NF of the State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, which was subject to obligatory reporting to VATESI in accordance with the established requirements. During the event, while performing preparatory work for the initial decontamination of Class A very low-level radioactive waste an internal fire occurred in the dust collector of a shot-blasting unit at the radioactive metal waste pre-treatment complex, located more than 250 metres from the main plant units.

The unusual event did not breach the barriers stopping radionuclides and/or inhibiting ionising radiation and did not affect nuclear safety, either. According to the INES, the unusual event occurring in 2025 was classified as below the scale level, i.e. at level 0. The low number of unusual events and the fact that they did not affect key safety functions demonstrate that a high level of safety was maintained at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant and other nuclear facilities in Lithuania.

In 2025, 10 meetings of the Commission for the Analysis of Unusual Events and Operational Experience were held at VATESI, during which unusual events that occurred at the Ignalina NPP and foreign-based NFs were examined.


Taking into account the experience gained from the operation of NFs in other countries and the lessons learnt from the unusual events, recommendations related to the improvement and assurance of safety in the NFs of the Ignalina NPP were developed. The analysis of



Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant

such events and the application of the lessons learned are necessary to prevent the recurrence of similar events in the NFs of the Ignalina NPP.

Reportable unusual events that occurred at the Ignalina NPP in 2020–2025



Ignalina NPP safety and security culture, employee training and certification

Safety and security culture of the Ignalina NPP

The attitudes of the organisation’s managers towards employees and activities, the style of management, responsibility for safety, relationships, employee promotion, training and learning, and the use of operational experience – the combination of these and many other makes it possible to assess the maturity of the organisation’s safety and security culture.

In order to assess and continuously improve the state of the safety and security culture at Ignalina Nu-

clear Power Plant, safety and security culture indicators and their developments were analysed on a quarterly basis in 2025, with the results discussed during management meetings. Employee training and briefings, including for physical security personnel, were carried out in accordance with the organisation's plans. Safety culture guidelines were also prepared for suppliers and contractors, and their employees were familiarised with them.

In 2025, as part of its supervision of the safety and security culture at the Ignalina NPP, VATESI reviewed the entity's reports on the safety culture, quarterly assessment reports on the nuclear safety culture indicator, and trends in the safety culture and safety culture indicators. In 2025, safety culture indicators were assessed using a new calculation methodology, which continues to be refined.

The annual safety culture self-assessment indicator at the Ignalina NPP has remained stable at 99% since 2020.

Ignalina NPP employee training and certification

The selection, introductory and follow-up training, periodic certification and continuous improvement of the competence development system of the staff working in NFs ensure an adequate level of competence of the staff and have a significant impact on the safety culture of the organisation.

Ensuring the competence of employees is one of the components of Ignalina NPP's activities related to its operational safety.

In 2025, VATESI coordinated training programmes and examination papers for Ignalina NPP staff responsible for nuclear safety and participated in the examinations for testing the knowledge of 35 professionals. The Ignalina NPP organises introductory and follow-up training and certification of its staff in order to maintain their competences and to provide the staff with new knowledge and skills that are necessary for working with new equipment in decommissioning projects.

In 2025, a total of 1,498 persons were trained and certified at the Ignalina NPP, including 152 managers, 762 professionals, 561 workers, and 23 office staff members.

Each year, the Ignalina NPP analyses the results of the process of maintaining staff qualifications and presents the results in the progress report on maintaining the staff qualifications. VATESI reviews documents related to ensuring the competence of the staff, draws conclusions, harmonises key technical standard documents and carries out inspections.




VATESI inspector during an inspection at Ignalina NPP

In 2025, VATESI carried out an inspection of the Ignalina NPP's compliance with the nuclear safety normative technical documents regulating human resources management and the assurance of employees' knowledge and skills necessary for safe operation. No violations were identified during the inspection.

Ignalina NPP emergency preparedness

As the risk of incidents and accidents during the decommissioning and dismantling of the Ignalina NPP power units is constantly changing, and when operating and preparing for the operation of new radioactive waste management and storage facilities, the Ignalina NPP is required to continuously assess potential threats and update the emergency preparedness documentation accordingly, as well as ensure the preparedness of the members of the Emergency Preparedness Organisation to respond to possible unusual events.

To ensure the preparedness of the Ignalina NPP Emergency Control Centre, equipment of the Centre is regularly inspected, malfunctions are rectified, and documentation is updated. During 2025, the potable water reserve was replaced, maintenance work was carried out on the diesel generator, and fuel reserves were replenished; the uninterruptible power supplies for the emergency alert system were replaced, maintenance work was carried out on the control equipment for the electric motors of the ventilation system, and a preventive check of the dosimetric control system was performed.



View of the reactor after the removal of the steam and water pipelines

The qualification and preparedness of the staff of the Ignalina NPP Emergency Preparedness Organisation to respond to emergency situations are ensured through training and drills organised in accordance with the schedule for emergency preparedness and civil protection classes, exercises and drills approved by the head of the Ignalina NPP. In 2025, 40 training sessions were conducted.

In 2025, the Ignalina NPP organised table-top and functional drills to practice response actions to be taken in the event of a simulated exposition on the Ignalina NPP's premises. The purpose of the drills was to verify in practice the adequacy of the emergency preparedness and fire safety documents and instructions for the management of the unusual event and to improve the preparedness of the staff to respond to potential incidents.

VATESI professionals regularly cooperate with the staff of the Ignalina NPP on improving the management of potential accidents at the plant, reviewing and co-ordinating emergency preparedness documents, and carrying out regular inspections.

Limitation of releases of radionuclides to the environment

To protect the environment and the population, the activities of radionuclides released from the Ignalina NPP into the atmosphere and the Lake Drūkšiai are limited. The results of the radiological monitoring carried out at the Ignalina NPP in 2025 are presented in the table below.

The radiological monitoring results show that the activities of radionuclides released were below activity limits. In 2025, the activity of the C-14 radionuclide accounted for the highest proportion of the radionuclide activity released to atmosphere ($7.56 \cdot 10^{10}$ Bq/year) and was similar to the activity of the C-14 radionuclide released to atmosphere in 2024 ($6.50 \cdot 10^{10}$ Bq/year).

As the controlled nuclear reaction that had generated short-lived inert radioactive aerosols and radioactive iodine (I-131) had stopped in both reactors, the residual radionuclides were no longer released to the atmosphere upon disintegration.


Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.9.1-2017 stipulate that the NF must be designed, commissioned, operated and decommissioned so that, under the normal operating regime of the facility and in cases of anticipated operational occurrences, the annual effective dose to the population resulting from the release of radionuclides from the NF does not exceed the dose constraint. Hygiene Standard HN73:2018 establishes the annual effective dose constraint for the population of 0.2 mSv. The measurement of the activities of radionuclides released to the environment from the Ignalina NPP and the assessment of their potential effects on the population showed that the exposure of the representative persons was negligible and constituted a very small fraction of the dose constraint.

The monitoring of the activities of radionuclides released to the environment showed that preparations for the decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP and the dismantling and decontamination projects for the units of the Ignalina NPP were carried out safely in 2025.

Activities of radionuclides released to the environment from the Ignalina NPP in 2025 and resulting exposure doses to the population.

Type of releases	Activity, Bq/year	Percentage of activity limit	Dose, Sv	Percentage of dose constraint
To atmosphere	$1.01 \cdot 10^{11}$	57.6	$4.55 \cdot 10^{-6}$	2.28
To water	$5.422 \cdot 10^{10}$	0.36	$2.95 \cdot 10^{-7}$	0.15
Total	$1.55 \cdot 10^{11}$	58	$4.85 \cdot 10^{-6}$	2.43

SAFETY SUPERVISION IN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT



Safety supervision in radioactive waste management

Radioactive waste management includes the pre-treatment, treatment, conditioning, radiological characterisation, transport, storage, and disposal of radioactive waste. The main objective of these activities is to manage radioactive waste in a way that does not cause harmful impact on people and the environment.

The largest amount of radioactive waste in Lithuania (more than 99%) is generated at the NFs operated by the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant. This entity is also a radioactive waste manager responsible for the disposal of waste and for the operation of radioactive waste repositories for this waste.

VATESI is the principal regulatory authority for the safety of radioactive waste management, establishing the requirements for the classification of radioactive waste and the safety requirements for radioactive waste management at NFs, licensing radioactive waste management facilities, and carrying out inspections to supervise compliance with legal requirements.

Supervision of radioactive waste management at the Ignalina NPP

Management and storage of spent nuclear fuel

Spent nuclear fuel is highly radioactive and heat generating waste that contains a relatively high amount of fissile material. Spent fuel is considered to be managed safely, if it is ensured that no chain fission reaction occurs under normal and emergency conditions, if spent fuel assemblies are sufficiently cooled, if appropriate barriers for radiation shielding are established, and if radionuclide containment barriers are maintained or new ones are developed to prevent radionuclide releases into the environment. The dry storage method has been selected for spent nuclear fuel storage in Lithuania (until the installation of the deep geological repository): spent nuclear fuel is loaded into designated containers stored in two storage facilities.

The first spent nuclear fuel storage facility (SFSF-1) operated on the site of the Ignalina NPP is fully loaded.



Spent Fuel Storage Facility (SFSF-1)

A total of 118 casks containing spent nuclear fuel (20 CASTOR RBMK casks and 98 CONSTOR RBMK-1500 ones) are stored there. Each cask contains 51 spent nuclear fuel assemblies. In total, 6,016 spent nuclear fuel assemblies are stored in the storage facility. The facility stores spent fuel with 2% initial enrichment of uranium (U-235).



The second spent fuel storage facility (SFSF-2) stores 190 CONSTOR® RBMK1500/M2 casks (168 with undamaged spent nuclear fuel and 22 with damaged fuel) and 15,555 spent nuclear fuel assemblies, plus one extra empty cask for the re-load of spent fuel in the storage facility's hot cell if any of the loaded casks lose its leak-tightness under certain circumstances. This facility also stores eight special metal casks containing fresh nuclear fuel (74 fuel assemblies).

In accordance with the internal procedures and normative technical acts adopted by the Ignalina NPP, both storage facilities were subject to maintenance and periodic inspection of the stored containers, as well as to temperature control of the container bodies and to radiation monitoring of the surfaces of the containers.

Radioactive waste in Lithuanian nuclear facilities

WHAT IS RADIOACTIVE WASTE?

Radioactive waste is spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive material that is contaminated with or contains radionuclides and is considered unsuitable for further use according to its purpose.

	SHORT-LIVED VERY LOW LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE	SHORT-LIVED LOW AND INTERMEDIATE LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE	SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND OTHER LONG-LIVED WASTE	DISUSED SEALED SOURCES
HOW IS IT GENERATED?	It is generated during repairs of installations and cleaning premises of Ignalina NPP, and during decommissioning. 	It is generated during repairs, small-scale works in the central hall, spent fuel storage pools of Ignalina NPP, and during decommissioning. 	It has accumulated during Ignalina NPP operation, and is generated during decommissioning and dismantling. 	By Ignalina NPP and other industrial companies, medical and research institutions. 
WHAT DOES IT LOOK LIKE?	Paper and cotton waste, pieces of power cables, filters, metal parts of installations, rubber and heat insulation material, construction waste. 	Worn out or dismantled equipment, pipes, structural elements, construction waste. 	Spent nuclear fuel assemblies, their structural elements, fuel channels, parts of control and safety systems, graphite. 	For instance, devices not in use. 
WHERE AND HOW IS IT STORED?	It is placed in metal containers (after pressing some of it into bales and wrapping them into polyethylene film) and stored in a storage facility in the territory of Ignalina NPP. It will be shipped to the repository for very low level radioactive waste later, once it is installed. 	It is processed (incinerated, pressed, placed into reinforced concrete containers, cemented) and stored in storage facilities in the territory of Ignalina NPP. It will be shipped to the repository for low and intermediate level short-lived radioactive waste later, once it is installed. 	It is placed into containers and shipped for storage to the spent nuclear fuel and other storage facilities in the territory of Ignalina NPP. This waste will be stored in these facilities for up to 50 years, and later placed in a deep geological repository. 	They are stored in storage facilities in the territory of Ignalina NPP. In the future this waste will be sorted, packed into special packages and placed into a repository meant for these sources. 
HOW LONG WILL IT BE DANGEROUS TO PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT?	100 years	300 years	> 1 000 years	From 100 to thousands of years. > 100 years

Solid radioactive waste

Solid radioactive waste accumulated during the operation of the Ignalina NPP is temporarily stored in the solid radioactive waste storage facilities (Buildings 155 and 155/1 and Buildings 157 and 157/1) on the territory of the Ignalina NPP. During the entire operation of Ignalina NPP, 27,178 m³ of unprocessed solid radioactive waste were generated. In the above-mentioned storage facilities, unprocessed solid radioactive waste is stored in bulk. Thus, the radioactive waste must be retrieved from the storage facilities and sorted, characterised and processed in line with its radiological and other characteristics, and undergo conditioning to prepare it for disposal in repositories. In this way, it is ensured that solid radioactive waste is managed safely and that the harmful impact of radiation on the environment and people is kept at a minimum. Radioactive waste generated during decommissioning is no longer placed for storage in the above-mentioned storage facilities: it is managed in new radioactive waste management installations and subsequently stored in newly built radioactive waste storage facilities.

Short-lived very low level radioactive waste (Class A waste according to the classification provided for in Nuclear Safety Requirements [BSR-3.1.2-2017](#)) is stored in the very low level radioactive waste buffer storage facility and in specially equipped storage areas in the former turbine hall building (room 101/1 of Building G1 or room 101/2 of Building G2). From these locations, the radioactive waste is transferred

to the very low level waste repository at least once in two years.

Facilities of solid radioactive waste retrieval from Buildings 155 and 155/1 and their pre-treatment facilities are used for the retrieval, sorting, compression and packaging of solid radioactive waste. In 2025, 260 m³ of radioactive waste were retrieved from Building 155 and, after pre-treatment, packaged into 12 packages of non-compacted waste. Since the start of operation of the retrieval facilities, a total of 2,503.8 m³ of radioactive waste have been retrieved, pre-treated and packaged in 502 packages of compacted waste and 87 packages of non-compacted waste.

This building is also used for the temporary storage of radioactive waste brought from Maišiagala RWSF. During 2025, a total of 238.75 m³ of bulk radioactive waste packaged in flexible intermediate bulk containers was transferred from the Maišiagala RWSF and placed there.


During retrieval of solid radioactive waste in Buildings 157 and 157/1, the waste is retrieved from the storage facilities in the buildings above, placed in transport containers and transported for sorting and handling to the solid radioactive waste management facilities. In 2025, 2,004 m³ of short-lived very low, low and intermediate level radioactive waste and 88.8 m³ of long-lived high level radioactive waste were retrieved from the storage facilities. In total, 5,743.6 m³ of short-lived very low, low and intermediate level radioactive waste and 379.4 m³ of long-lived high level radioactive waste were retrieved during the entire period of retrieval of radioactive waste.

In 2025, the total number of packages produced at the solid waste management and storage facilities included 187 packages of radioactive waste containing short-lived low and intermediate level radioactive waste (Class B and C) and 61 packages of long-lived low and intermediate level waste (Class D and E). The total number of packages stored in the facilities as of the end of 2025 was 559 packages of Class B and C radioactive waste, 186 packages of Class D and E radioactive waste and 11 packages of spent sealed radioactive sources (Class F radioactive waste). At the end of 2025, the storage facilities were filled to 41 per cent of their designed storage capacity. The solid radioactive waste management and storage facilities are designed to manage, in accordance with modern international requirements, all solid radioactive waste generated during the operation and decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP, and to store long-lived radioactive waste for up to 50 years.



Containers with solid radioactive waste


Radioactive waste volume 2025



VLLR - very low level radioactive waste;
LL-LILR - long-lived low and intermediate level radioactive waste;
SNFA - spent nuclear fuel assemblies

SL-LILR - short-lived low and intermediate level radioactive waste;
HLR - high level radioactive waste;
DSS - disused sealed sources.

Radioactive waste management scheme



EXPLANATIONS

The different color of the arrows indicates a specific flow of radioactive waste. Arrows in the chart indicate the planned, ongoing or no longer performed radioactive waste management activities. Numbers denote nuclear facilities.

- Free-released waste (class 0)
- Short-lived very low level radioactive waste (class A)
- Short-lived low and intermediate level radioactive waste (class B and C)
- Long-lived low and intermediate level radioactive waste (class D and E)
- Disused sealed sources (class F)
- Spent nuclear fuel (class G)
- Unsorted radioactive waste (until 1989)

Radioactive waste management activities:

- - - Planned
- In progress
- No longer in place

1. Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP)
2. Liquid radioactive waste evaporation equipment
3. Solid radioactive waste storage facility (155, 155/1)
4. Solid radioactive waste storage facility (157, 157/1)
5. INPP industrial waste landfill
6. Bituminised radioactive waste storage facility
7. Free-release measurement facility (159B)
8. Very low level radioactive waste storage facility (characterization, storage)
9. Retrieval of solid radioactive waste and their pre-treatment facilities (Project B2-1) (sorting, packaging)

10. Solid radioactive waste management and storage facilities (B 3/4) (sorting, cutting, compaction, incineration, grouting, packaging, characterization, storage)
11. Retrieval of solid radioactive waste and their pre-treatment facilities (Project B2-2)
12. Cemented radioactive waste storage facility
13. Maišiagalė Radioactive Waste Storage Facility
14. Spent nuclear fuel storage facilities
15. Free-release measurement facility (B10)
16. Very low level radioactive waste repository
17. Bituminised radioactive waste storage facility
18. Low and intermediate level radioactive waste repository
19. Deep geological repository

In 2025, VATESI carried out inspections, examined and approved solutions and modifications developed by the Ignalina NPP to address the challenges of solid radioactive waste management and to implement additional safety improvement measures. Part of these measures was implemented in 2025, while implementation of the remaining measures is planned for 2026.

Liquid radioactive waste

The aqueous medium facilitates the dispersion of radionuclides to the environment and, to prevent this, liquid radioactive waste (contaminated NF process water and filtration substances used to treat contaminated water) is solidified by cementation, bituminisation, or other methods of binding residual water in this type of waste. Typically, prior to solidification, liquid radioactive waste is reduced in volume by evaporation and separation of clean water from the contaminated residue and filtration substances, which are further treated as radioactive waste. Liquid radioactive waste generated at the Ignalina NPP is evaporated in dedicated evaporation facilities. The vapours generated during evaporation are filtered with special ion-exchange and perlite filters that absorb radionuclides. These filters are subsequently cemented and stored as radioactive waste in the cemented radioactive waste storage facility.

Previously, the evaporation residue was solidified by bituminisation; since 2019, the Ignalina Nuclear Power

Plant has been solidifying evaporation residue through cementation.

During 2025, 486.94 m³ of liquid radioactive waste were treated in the cementing facility and 3,828 cemented waste packages (drums) were produced. At the end of 2025, 3,754 containers with 30,032 cemented liquid waste packages (drums) were stored in the cemented waste storage facility.

In 2025, inspections carried out by VATESI verified that liquid radioactive waste at the Ignalina NPP is handled in accordance with safety requirements. In 2025, VATESI approved the updated descriptions of operating limits and conditions for the bituminised and cemented radioactive waste storage facilities of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, as well as part of the safety justification documents for modifications to evaporation facilities intended for innovative and efficient management of liquid radioactive waste. VATESI also initiated the review of the updated Periodic Safety Assessment Report for the Bituminised Waste Storage Facility, submitted by the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant at the end of 2025 for approval following VATESI comments.


Clearance of waste

Radioactive waste is defined as waste with levels of contamination by radionuclides above the clearance levels of radionuclide activity set by legislation. All waste within a radiologically controlled area shall be considered radioactive until the level of contamination is measured and it is demonstrated that the values of radionuclide contamination do not exceed the applicable clearance levels. Such waste shall be safe for placement in conventional landfills or for reuse as secondary raw materials. For example, some equipment or metal parts can be reused in industry or construction waste can be managed as conventional. Special measurement devices are used to determine whether waste meets the clearance levels, i.e. whether potentially non-radioactive waste is indeed non-radioactive. Such devices are in place in Buildings 159B and B10 of the Ignalina NPP. During 2025, 1,745.73 m³ of materials and waste were measured in these facilities, determined to be non-radioactive according to measurement results, and removed for reuse or disposal. VATESI assesses the measurement results of each radioactive waste package and only, once it has been confirmed on the basis of these results that the waste is non-radioactive, authorises its removal from the site of the Ignalina NPP.



Container with cemented waste

Radioactive waste storage facilities near Ignalina NPP territory



Very low level radioactive waste repository

The very low level waste repository (the Repository) was built on a site adjacent to the Ignalina NPP, located south of the Second Spent Fuel Storage Facility (SFSF-2) and the Solid Waste Management and Storage Facility. The Repository modules are designed to dispose very low level waste in compliance with safety requirements ensuring adequate protection of people and the environment from potentially harmful radiological impact. The Repository will consist of three modules, each containing approximately 20,000 m³ of radioactive waste. The emplacement of radioactive waste in the Repository is carried out in campaigns at least once every two years. It is planned that the Repository will be filled by 2038, when the decommissioning activities of the Ignalina NPP are completed. After the Repository has been filled and closed, active supervision and radiological monitoring will be carried out for the first 30 years, followed by 70 years of passive supervision. Once the supervision period has ended, the Repository site will be available for unrestricted use.

Disposal of radioactive waste into the Repository started in 2022, when VATESI issued a permit to the Ignalina NPP for the delivery of radioactive waste to the Repository and the first tests using radioactive waste were conducted.

In April 2025, the third waste disposal campaign was completed, and engineered barriers (a multi-layer cover system) were installed to isolate radioactive waste from the environment and protect the Repository against external impacts.

In April-June 2025, VATESI approved the documents submitted by the Ignalina NPP, including the

repository commissioning test report, the final storage facility report and the final safety analysis report for the Repository, and the commissioning acceptance report for the Repository. On the basis of these documents, on 30 June 2025, VATESI issued a permit to the Ignalina NPP to commence industrial operation of the Very Low Level Radioactive Waste Repository.

The results of the monitoring programme carried out in 2025 show that the Repository does not have any negative impact on the environment: the level of ionising radiation in the Repository during and after the radioactive waste emplacement campaign does not exceed the values laid down in the regulatory documents and in the technical design; no releases of radioactive substances into the environment have been recorded. The settlement of the Repository's foundation slab is acceptable for its continued operation in accordance with the requirements of the technical design. The engineered barrier layer of bentonite carpet and high-density polyethylene (HDPE) geomembrane reliably protect the Repository module against ingress of water.

Low and intermediate level radioactive waste repository

In 2025, construction activities commenced for the near-surface repository for short-lived low and intermediate level radioactive waste (the Repository).

The Repository will be constructed on a 45-hectare site adjacent to other radioactive waste management facilities of the power plant within the municipality of Visaginas. It will consist of three reinforced concrete modules with a total capacity of up to 100,000 m³ of radioactive waste packages (reinforced concrete containers with radioactive waste immobilised in concrete). Waste will be emplaced in the Repository throughout the entire decommissioning period of the Ignalina NPP, and the Repository is planned to be completely filled by 2038. Following closure, institutional control of the Repository will continue for at least 300 years. During the initial 100-year period, physical protection, maintenance activities, and radiological monitoring of the Repository and the environment will have to be ensured. The period of passive supervision will continue for a further 200 years.

In 2025, the Ignalina NPP carried out site preparation and earthworks. During this period, VATESI reviewed and assessed the submitted design proposals for the engineered barrier model of the Repository, the public consultation report, the justification for the use of inert waste, and the clay characterisation programme.



Mound of the very low level radioactive waste repository

Supervision of decommissioning of the Maišiagala Radioactive Waste Storage Facility

The Maišiagala RWSF, which is located in Bartkuškis Forest, in Širvintos District, 9 km away from Maišiagala town and about 40 km away from Vilnius, was storing radioactive waste collected from industrial enterprises, medical and scientific institutions between 1963 and 1989. The storage facility was closed in 1989.

Taking into account modern requirements for radioactive waste management and expert conclusions drawn in 2006, the Maišiagala RWSF could not be the disposal site, and a decision was therefore taken to decommission the Maišiagala RWSF.

In 2021, VATESI issued a licence to the Ignalina NPP to carry out decommissioning: to retrieve radioactive waste, radionuclide-contaminated structures and soil from the vault and site of the Maišiagala RWSF and to clean up the site in such a way as to ensure that it becomes free from radiological contamination. As part of the decommissioning of the storage facility, the Ignalina NPP constructed temporary structures and installed the necessary equipment for the retrieval of radioactive waste from the facility. Using this equipment, radioactive waste was retrieved from the storage vault of the facility, after which the radionuclide-contaminated vault structures were dismantled.

During 2025, the Ignalina NPP completed the transfer of all retrieved radioactive waste and radioactive waste generated during decommissioning to the radioactive waste management facilities of the Ignalina NPP located within the municipality of Visaginas for further storage and treatment.

As part of the safety supervision of the decommissioning of the Maišiagala RAS in 2025, VATESI reviewed and assessed the decision concerning the retrieval of reinforced concrete fragments remaining in the storage

vault pit and their safe transport to the Ignalina NPP for temporary storage. VATESI also approved the historical assessment reports and final radiological survey reports prepared by the Ignalina NPP, which confirmed that the administrative building, the garage/storage facility, the former decontamination building and the electrical transformer, water supply, sewerage, electrical, communication and security systems, and the protective fence on the site of the Maišiagala RWSF comply with clearance levels, and, in accordance with the final decommissioning plan for the Maišiagala RWSF, these structures and systems will not be dismantled or demolished. From the radiological protection perspective, no restrictions will apply to the future use of this infrastructure remaining at the Maišiagala RWSF site.

In 2025, by decision of VATESI, confirmatory radiological surveys of the Maišiagala RWSF vault pit were carried out. The surveys were performed by professionals from the Radiation Protection Centre, who collected samples from the bottom of the storage vault and analysed them in a laboratory. After residual radiological contamination by caesium (Cs-137) and radium (Ra-226) radionuclides had been identified, the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant continued remediation of the vault pit by excavating an additional soil layer. Repeated final and confirmatory radiological surveys demonstrated that the investigated objects were no longer contaminated with radionuclides.

In 2025, VATESI reviewed and assessed information submitted by the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant regarding the need for radiological monitoring of groundwater at the Maišiagala RWSF site. VATESI concluded that groundwater radiological monitoring at the site should continue in order to confirm that residual tritium contamination in groundwater is decreasing and that its concentrations no longer exceed the established reference level for groundwater. For this purpose, a description of the supervision and control measures for the former storage facility site must be prepared and approved by VATESI.

Following the removal of all nuclear and other radioactive materials from the Maišiagala RWSF, VATESI in 2025 approved, and the Ignalina NPP implemented, a modification of the physical protection system of the Maišiagala RWSF, retaining only those physical protection measures necessary to ensure the general industrial level of physical protection.

In January 2026, VATESI accepted for review the final decommissioning report for the Maišiagala RWSF prepared by the Ignalina NPP together with the application for revocation of the Maišiagala RWSF decommissioning licence. Once VATESI revokes the licence, the Maišiagala RWSF will no longer be classified as a nuclear facility. However, the Ignalina NPP will continue to conduct radiological monitoring of groundwater in part of the former repository site.



Maišiagala Radioactive Waste Storage Facility in 2021 and 2026

NON-PROLIFERATION CONTROL



Non-proliferation control

The implementation of non-proliferation commitments is a complex activity including the implementation of IAEA and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) safeguards, the control of nuclear dual-use items or the prohibition of nuclear testing.

Implementation of IAEA and Euratom safeguards

The IAEA and Euratom Safeguards are a set of control measures (inspections, remote monitoring and other control systems) put in place by the IAEA and the European Commission to verify compliance with commitments under the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](#) to prevent the use of nuclear energy for non-peaceful purposes. Lithuania has acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, thereby declaring that all activities involving nuclear material in the Republic of Lithuania shall be used for peaceful purposes only. In compliance with this Treaty, and by signing the [Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA](#) on the application of safeguards and its [Additional Protocol](#), Lithuania committed to ensure access for international inspectors to carry out inspections and to provide all information on the country's nuclear activities. After joining the EU, Lithuania also became a member of Euratom, and the European Commission started [safeguarding](#) nuclear material together with the IAEA. Also, after becoming a member of the EU, on 1 January 2008 Lithuania switched from the bilateral agreement with the IAEA on the application of safeguards and its Additional Protocol to the [trilateral agreement](#) (between Member States, Euratom and the IAEA) on the application of safeguards and the implementation of its [Addition Protocol](#).

To properly safeguard nuclear material, the European Commission assigns individual material balance area (MBA) codes to companies, organisations or institutions holding nuclear material. At the end of 2025, there were a total of 11 MBA codes in Lithuania.



Calibration plates containing plutonium

The Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant was assigned six MBA codes (of which two are not active, as those MBA no longer hold nuclear material). Another four codes represented material balance areas for entities with small quantities of nuclear material and one MBA code was for the national material balance area accounted for by VATESI. VATESI's material balance area (WLTC) accounts for nuclear material held by economic entities on a temporary basis and therefore it would not be appropriate for them to apply to the European Commission for an individual MBA code. In 2025, nuclear material held by four economic entities was accounted for in the VATESI's MBA.

All entities with assigned MBAs are required to provide regular information to VATESI and the European Commission on changes in the nuclear material in the MBAs and to update different relevant technical information accordingly. In 2025 VATESI continued to monitor and, where necessary, advise the economic entities

to ensure that they submit all the necessary information to the European Commission in a timely manner.

In exercising control over the international non-proliferation commitments assumed by the Republic of Lithuania, in 2025, IAEA, European Commission and VATESI inspectors visited two Lithuanian entities declaring activities with nuclear material. During the visit, the inspectors verified whether the companies were engaged exclusively in the activities for peaceful purposes, whether all nuclear materials were properly accounted for, and whether no other undeclared activities involving nuclear or nuclear fuel cycle materials were being carried out.

In early July 2025, planned physical inventory verification at the Ignalina NPP site and the storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel was carried out by the IAEA, the European Commission and VATESI experts. During physical inventory verification, sealed fresh nuclear fuel loaded in containers was verified at the second spent fuel storage facility (SFSF-2), as well as spent nuclear fuel stored in both spent fuel storage facilities, and, additionally, premises in both units and fuel storage pools of the Ignalina NPP were inspected. During the physical inventory verification, inspectors from VATESI, the IAEA and the European Commission identified no violations.

In 2025, in order to ensure that the entities accounting for their nuclear material in the VATESI's MBA are implementing the requirements for accounting and control of nuclear material, VATESI experts inspected the nuclear material held by two entities and evaluated how the physical inventory of the nuclear material is carried out.

Inspections carried out by international inspectors and information provided by Lithuania regarding activities in the field of nuclear energy use enabled the IAEA to conclude that all the nuclear material and activities declared by the country were used only for peaceful purposes and that there was no evidence of undeclared nuclear material or activities. In the 2025 Safeguards Implementation Report, the IAEA once again reached a positive conclusion that all the nuclear material used and activities that took place in the Republic of Lithuania in 2024 were exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA's opinion for 2025 will be submitted in mid-2026.

Control of nuclear dual-use items

To contribute to the non-proliferation regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was established in 1974 that brought together countries with nuclear

technologies and set the terms under which nuclear and dual-use material, equipment and technology may be transferred from one country to another. Lithuania became a member of the group in 2004.

In accordance with these terms, and in line with the legislation of the Republic of Lithuania and the EU, VATESI, together with other institutions, carries out controls on the export, import, transit, brokering and transfer of strategic goods in the European Union, and participates in the issuance of conclusions on the export and import of dual-use items. In 2025, VATESI provided conclusions on 65 applications for dual-use export licences. The main exporters of these items are Lithuanian economic entities producing laser systems and components.

VATESI conclusions on export and import of dual-use items in 2015–2025



In case of imported nuclear dual-use items, VATESI, together with the Ministry of the Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania, issues State guarantees (a letter confirming the end use) to the supplier country of the imported items regarding the peaceful use of such items. The sole importer of such items in Lithuania is the Ignalina NPP. In 2025, no such nuclear dual-use items were imported.

In June 2025, VATESI carried out an inspection at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant to verify that the plant was properly using and storing previously imported nuclear dual-use items for which end-use certificates had been issued. The inspection identified one minor non-compliance with regulatory requirements related to the internal control of nuclear dual-use items at the Ignalina NPP. The non-compliance was corrected by the Ignalina NPP before the end of 2025.

NUCLEAR SECURITY



Nuclear security

Nuclear security is the prevention, detection of and response to any illegal activity (theft of nuclear or other radioactive material, diversion, illegal movement of such material, unauthorised access to facilities where such material is stored and used, or other related criminal acts).

The physical security of NFs, nuclear and other radioactive material is among the components of nuclear security.

Physical security of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

Physical security of nuclear fuel cycle material, other radioactive material and NFs consists of the totality of competencies and measures to protect NFs, nuclear, nuclear fuel cycle and other radioactive material from unlawful possession or seizure, and from other unlawful acts that would pose a risk to human health and safety due to radiation exposure.



Security road blocker

In line with best international practices and IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations, the physical security system for NFs and nuclear material should be designed with a view to protecting against potential intruders whose characteristics are described in the design basis threat documents. Design basis threat assessment is the initial step in the development and maintenance of a physical security system to help answer the question of what the NF or activities with nuclear material need to be protected against. A design basis threat document is the document providing the description of the following characteristics of potential adversaries: motivation, intention, knowledge, tools, vehicles, capabilities and capacities, and containing other information that describes the potential adversaries. In Lithuania, design basis threats are approved by the Head of VATESI and assigned for all NFs and activities such as the transport of relevant nuclear material.

Taking into account that, in October 2024, VATESI issued a licence for the decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP power units and the older radioactive waste management facilities, on 7 April 2025 the Head of VATESI revoked the obsolete design basis threat document and approved revised design basis threat documents for other NFs and activities in the decommissioning phase.

On 26 November 2025, the annual meeting of the Commission for Assessing Design Basis Threats took place, attended by representatives of the State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania, the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania, the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, and VATESI. The meeting was also attended by invited experts from the Public Security Service under the Ministry of the Interior, the National Cyber Security Centre under the Ministry of the National Defence, the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, and the National Crisis Management Centre. The meeting discussed the changed geopolitical situation and the resulting increased security risk to nuclear facilities in Lithuania. Having assessed the existing design basis threat documents, the Commission proposed that the Head of VATESI revise the design basis threat documents for NFs and nuclear material.

VATESI developed drafts of design basis threat documents and initiated their harmonisation with the relevant authorities.

In order to respond to the evolving nuclear security situation in an appropriate and timely manner, VATESI regularly informs the members of the Commission for Assessing Design Basis Threats about nuclear security events worldwide. In 2025, information was shared on radioactive sources stolen during the armed conflict in Sudan, attempts to sell nuclear material and to procure it illicitly in Georgia, boxes bearing radiation warning signs discovered in a hotel in the Côte d'Ivoire, and radioactive sources stolen and subsequently recovered by police in India.

As part of the decommissioning of Ignalina NPP's reactors and the corresponding modification of the physical security system, VATESI in 2025 reviewed various safety justification documents submitted by the license holder in relation to the physical security assurance (physical security assurance plans, descriptions of technical measures, technical solutions for modifications, etc.).

With a view to assessing whether the technical and organisational measures of the physical security system of the NF, including the actions taken by the security and response forces, are capable of achieving the objectives set for them, the Ignalina NPP, together with the Visaginas Unit of the Public Security Service under the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania, carried out physical protection system performance tests at the Ignalina NPP site in 2025. In accordance with the performance testing programme and adversary scenarios approved by VATESI, performance tests were conducted for the physical protection systems in Units 1 and 2 of the Ignalina NPP, the solid radioactive waste retrieval, pre-treatment and management facility, the storage facilities and the spent fuel storage facility (SFSS-1). The results demonstrated that the physical protection systems were operating as intended by the design documentation and were considered effective.

As every year, VATESI experts carried out inspections in the field of physical security at the NFs controlled by the Ignalina NPP. The inspections covered the physical security system and cyber security measures. General information on the inspections carried out by VATESI is provided in the section *Inspections*.

Prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material

To encourage member states to share information on incidents or illicit acts with nuclear or other radioactive material, and on cases of their smuggling, illicit transportation or disposal, the IAEA created the

Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) in 1995. It is a voluntary initiative which Lithuania is a party to. VATESI is responsible for providing such information to the IAEA and disseminating it to Lithuanian authorities. Currently 145 member states are parties to the ITDB.

Since joining the ITDB in 1996 to the end of 2025, VATESI submitted a total of 105 information reports on events in Lithuania.

In 2025, five incidents related to illicit material trafficking were recorded in Lithuania and reported by VATESI to the IAEA database:

- At the border control post of the Vilnius Airport Frontier Station, an antique aircraft compass was intercepted. The dial of the compass was coated with paint containing the radionuclide radium-226 (Ra-226).
- A lead container with a metal plate inside was discovered in Vilnius. The radionuclide americium-241 (Am-241) was identified.
- A trailer carrying waste was denied entry to a co-generation power plant because waste inside the container was emitting elevated levels of ionising radiation. The radionuclide identified was iodine-131 (I-131), a medical radionuclide.
- At the border control post of Vilnius Airport, an antique aircraft instrument panel emitting elevated levels of ionising radiation was intercepted. The dials of the panel were coated with paint containing radium-226 (Ra-226).
- At the Seaport Frontier Station of the Coastal Guard Frontier District, a lorry with a trailer carrying a cargo emitting elevated levels of ionising radiation was intercepted. Caesium-137 (Cs-137) was identified.

In 2025, IAEA member states submitted a total of 236 information reports on incidents or illicit acts with nuclear or other radioactive material, and updates to eight previous reports. Having received the information reports from the IAEA, VATESI forwarded them to the Police Department, RPC, the Nuclear Security Centre of Excellence, and the Dignitary Protection Service. Information on lost or stolen radioactive sources in Lithuania's neighbouring countries and on other events that may have implications for nuclear security in Lithuania was additionally forwarded to the State Border Guard Service under the Ministry of the Interior and the Customs Department. Information on events related to attempted sales of nuclear or other radioactive material and cases of theft was forwarded to the members of the Commission for Assessing Design Basis Threats.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION



International cooperation

International cooperation of VATESI is based on Lithuania's international obligations, membership in international organisations and bilateral agreements.

VATESI experts represent the national interests and participate in the activities of international organisations: they work in various working groups aimed at continuously improving the level of nuclear safety, physical security, and radiation protection in Lithuania and Europe, and exchange experience and best practices in nuclear activity regulation and supervision.

Convention on Nuclear Safety

Lithuania became a Contracting Party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) in 1996. All the Contracting Parties to the CNS must respect the principles of nuclear safety assurance laid down therein.

CNS objectives:

- To achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide;
- To develop and maintain effective measures against potential radiological hazards in nuclear facilities in order to protect people and the environment from the harmful effects of radiation resulting from the operation of such facilities;
- To prevent accidents with potential radiological consequences and to mitigate the consequences, if any.

Every three years, each Contracting Party shall submit a regular report on the measures taken to implement obligations under the CNS.

In 2025, VATESI carried out activities in preparation for the 10th CNS Review Meeting. These activities included preparing and submitting Lithuania's 10th national report on the implementation of its obligations under the Convention for peer review by the Contracting Parties, as well as reviewing national reports submitted by other countries and formulating questions and comments on those reports. Lithuania also nominated a VATESI representative to serve as an officer of the 10th CNS Review Meeting. The primary responsibility of the Review Meeting officers is to organise and facilitate an effective peer-review process among the

Contracting Parties, with the objective of promoting the continuous enhancement of nuclear safety.

Likewise, VATESI, in its role of coordinating the implementation of the provisions of the CNS in Lithuania, communicated with the Belarusian Ministry of Emergency Situations regarding the provision of information under Article 17 (Emergency Preparedness) of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, with a view to assessing the potential radiological consequences for Lithuania of a possible accident at the Belarusian NPP.

Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (the Convention) entered into force in Lithuania on 14 June 2004. Upon becoming a Contracting Party to the Convention, Lithuania acknowledges that it has the ultimate responsibility for spent fuel and radioactive waste management and for the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management within its territory, and undertakes to manage such spent fuel and radioactive waste in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

The principal objectives of the Convention are:

- to achieve and maintain a high level of safety worldwide in spent fuel management and radioactive waste management, through the enhancement of national measures and international co-operation, including, where appropriate, safety-related technical co-operation;
- to ensure that during all stages of spent fuel management and radioactive waste management there are effective defences against potential hazards so that individuals, society and the environment are protected from harmful effects of ionising radiation, now and in the future, in such a way that the needs and aspirations of the present generation are met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs and aspirations;



Lithuanian delegation at the Review Meeting of the Joint Convention in Vienna

- to prevent accidents with radiological consequences and to mitigate their consequences should they occur during any stage of spent fuel management or radioactive waste management.

In compliance with the provisions of the Convention, Lithuania is obliged to prepare a report, in line with the other Contracting Parties, providing information to the other Contracting Parties on the fulfilment of the obligations assumed.

At the 8th Review Meeting of the Convention held from 17 to 28 March 2025, the Lithuanian delegation presented Lithuania's report, prepared by VATESI in cooperation with other institutions, describing activities carried out over the previous three years in the field of the safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. The report provided information on the legislative and regulatory framework governing radioactive waste and spent fuel management in Lithuania, the licensing of management facilities, the decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP and the Maišiagala Radioactive Waste Storage Facility, the licensing of activities involving disused sealed radioactive sources and their management practices, and current and planned measures to enhance the safety of radioactive waste and spent fuel management.

Prior to the meeting, Lithuania identified four challenges currently associated with spent fuel management, radioactive waste management and the decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP. These challenges related to the implementation of the decommissioning plan and the Radioactive Waste Management Development Programme, the development of technologies

for reactor core dismantling and graphite management, solutions for the management of contaminated concrete resulting from demolished buildings, and the review of the financing framework for the deep geological repository project. These challenges were endorsed by the other Contracting Parties during the review process.

During the Review Meeting, two areas of good performance in Lithuania were highlighted: the progress achieved in the dismantling of the Ignalina NPP and the decommissioning of the Maišiagala storage facility, and the effective involvement of stakeholders in the implementation of radioactive waste repository programmes.

The Review Meeting also confirmed that Lithuania is meeting its obligations under the Joint Convention.

Convention on Early Notification and implementation of obligations under the Arrangements for the Early Exchange of Information in the Event of a Radiological Emergency 87/600/EURATOM

The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Council Decision 87/600/Euratom on Community arrangements for the early exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency, and bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries obligate Lithuania to timely and properly receive and provide information to the IAEA, the European Commission and the neighbouring countries on radiological and nuclear incidents and accidents that have occurred. VATESI has been appointed as the Lithuanian competent authority responsible for meeting the above commitments.

VATESI has in place a 24/7 Early Notification System. The designated and trained early notification officers are ready to respond to radiological and nuclear accidents, incidents or other unusual events and activate the Emergency Operations Centre of VATESI. The early notification officers regularly participate in unannounced communication testing drills organised by the IAEA and the European Commission. As part of international commitments to exchange information with the IAEA and the European Commission, VATESI uses USIE and WebECURIE information exchange systems which are the main tool for the national competent authorities to exchange information on various unusual events, exercises and in the event of a nuclear or radiological accident.

In 2025, information on 30 events was disseminated and about 250 notifications were posted in the information sharing systems. Most of the notifications were related to events at nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Other notifications related to missing, stolen or found sources

of ionising radiation or nuclear material, workers exposed to radiation, and minor incidents at nuclear power plants or nuclear installations.

In October 2025, a representative of VATESI participated in a remote meeting of the competent authorities of the European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE) system organised by the European Commission. The meeting discussed the implementation of the ECURIE system and future challenges related to the integration of the ECURIE system into a common European crisis management platform. Technical issues concerning information exchange tools and their resilience to various threats were addressed, as well as the situation at nuclear facilities in Ukraine and emerging risks. The results of recent exercises were also presented and discussed. Participation in the ECURIE system is compulsory for EU countries; Switzerland, North Macedonia, Norway, Iceland, Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey have joined the system voluntarily. Representatives from Ukraine and the IAEA also took part in the 2025 meeting.

Meetings of the competent authorities play an important role in strengthening and harmonising emergency preparedness in an international context.

VATESI, as the responsible competent authority under the above conventions and agreements, regularly participates in various IAEA and European Commission exercises. In addition to regular communication verification drills, in 2025, VATESI staff participated in IAEA's exercises ConvEx-2a and ConvEx-3, as well as the European Commission's exercise ECUREX-2025, aimed at testing the ability to use the IAEA and European Commission's information systems, provide information, fill out forms, and take decisions depending on the simulated emergency situation.

Participation in the environmental impact assessment activities to implement the Espoo Convention

The design, construction and operation of new nuclear power plants must comply with all international requirements on nuclear safety, radiation and environmental protection. To assess their impact on other countries, the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (the Espoo Convention) must be complied with.

VATESI is among Lithuanian authorities participating in NF environmental impact assessment activities and examining submitted documents related to the environmental impact assessment. The Lithuanian Ministry of the Environment is the authority responsible for



IAEA Headquarters in Vienna

implementing the provisions of the Espoo Convention in Lithuania.

In 2025, VATESI reviewed the environmental impact assessment documentation and related information forwarded by the Ministry of the Environment of the Republic of Lithuania concerning a proposed nuclear power plant on the south-western coast of Sweden, in Varberg Municipality. The project envisages either the construction of two large nuclear reactors or between three and five small modular reactors with a combined electrical output not exceeding 2,800 MW. VATESI also reviewed the strategic environmental assessment documentation for the detailed plan of the proposed nuclear power plant. Having examined the submitted documentation, VATESI concluded that the proposed activity in Sweden would not have a significant adverse impact on the environment of Lithuania and that there is therefore no need for Lithuania to participate in the transboundary strategic environmental assessment procedures.

VATESI reached the same conclusion after reviewing the strategic environmental assessment documentation relating to proposed amendments to nuclear energy legislation in Finland. It concluded that nuclear facilities in Finland are not expected to have an adverse environmental impact on Lithuania and that there is therefore no need for Lithuania to participate in the relevant transboundary strategic environmental assessment procedures.

VATESI also reviewed the environmental impact assessment programme submitted at the end of 2025 for a planned radioactive waste repository and interim storage facility in Belarus and provided their comments and recommendations.

Nuclear safety regulation in the European Union (ENSREG)

It is the responsibility of each EU country to regulate the safety of nuclear installations and related activities on its territory. To this end, countries have national nuclear safety regulatory frameworks based on three EU directives: the Nuclear Safety Directive, the Directive Establishing a Community Framework for the Responsible and Safe Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste, and the Basic Safety Standards Directive for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation.

In compliance with these EU directives and the principle of continuous improvement of nuclear safety, the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), consisting of the European Commission and executives and experts from the European Commission's Directorate-General for Energy, addresses the assurance and continuous improvement of the safety of NFs through regulation and supervision, including decommissioning and management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. ENSREG has three working groups to address specific issues: Nuclear Safety Improvement, Radioactive Waste Management, Spent Nuclear Fuel and Decommissioning, and Public Information and Transparency.

Two ENSREG meetings were held in April and October 2025. As in 2024, safety issues related to Ukraine's nuclear facilities, arising from Russia's military aggression against Ukraine, remained high on the ENSREG agenda. Representatives of the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) informed ENSREG members about the serious situation at the Zaporizhzhya NPP, which has been illegally seized and

is under Russian control. They also drew attention to the intensification of military actions against energy infrastructure, which is crucial for maintaining the safety of Ukraine's operating nuclear power plants, as well as the shut-down Zaporizhzhya NPP and the permanently shut-down Chornobyl NPP. It was emphasised that the equipment essential for the safety of the Zaporizhzhya NPP is not properly maintained and that there is a lack of qualified personnel. ENSREG has repeatedly stressed that Russia's illegal seizure of Zaporizhzhya NPP and its actions on and around the site is a major threat to nuclear safety, and that the risk of nuclear incidents will remain high as long as Russian forces are present on the Zaporizhzhya NPP site. ENSREG members are also unanimous in their view that Russian forces and their military equipment must be withdrawn from the Zaporizhzhya NPP site and the plant must be immediately returned to its rightful owner and to the supervision of the Ukrainian Nuclear Safety Regulatory Inspectorate. ENSREG supports the Ukrainian Nuclear Safety Regulatory Inspectorate and its staff, as well as personnel working at Ukraine's nuclear facilities under extremely difficult conditions, and strongly supports the efforts of the Director General of the IAEA to ensure the nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine.

In compliance with the Nuclear Safety Directive, Topical Peer Reviews of nuclear safety shall be held every six years, starting with 2016. The first Topical Peer Review took place in 2016-2017 and analysed ageing management of nuclear power plants and research reactors. In 2025, the second Topical Peer Review, dedicated to fire safety at nuclear installations, was completed. The review involved an in-depth assessment of fire safety arrangements at more than 120 nuclear installations, including nuclear power plants, nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors in 18 EU Member States and four non-EU countries (the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine). The overall conclusion of the review was that a variety of approaches and solutions are applied across Europe to address fire hazards and that no significant shortcomings were identified in the fire safety strategies of the installations reviewed, indicating that the overall framework is coherent. Effective management of fire loads and ignition sources, strong leadership, accountability and a well-established safety culture were also identified as key factors in reducing fire risk. The review identified both good practices and common challenges from a nuclear safety perspective at the European level. Detailed findings are presented in the main report and in 22 individual country review reports. Areas requiring further attention include the need to address emerging ignition sources, such as the increasing use of lithium-ion batteries. The review also highlighted the benefits of a common database



for sharing fire-related operating experience across all types of installations and the need for guidance to support the implementation of international standards in fire safety assessments, particularly at nuclear facilities other than power reactors. The report noted that both the national self-assessments and the peer review process provided valuable knowledge and learning opportunities for regulators and operators.

The authorities of the countries participating in the Topical Peer Review will prepare national action plans during 2025-2026. These plans will take account of the findings of both the self-assessments and the peer reviews and will ensure the timely implementation of safety improvements commensurate with their significance. ENSREG will also develop an EU-level action plan to address the identified safety issues.

In 2025, ENSREG members shared their experience in safety assessment related to small modular reactors and discussed the organisation of stress tests and the implementation of safety improvement measures in EU neighbouring countries (Armenia, Turkey, Iran and Egypt).

Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA)

The Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association (WENRA) was established in 1999. The main goal of the organisation is to develop a common approach towards nuclear safety. At WENRA events, country-delegated regulator representatives discuss nuclear safety regulation and supervision, share experience and important safety-related information, and plan nuclear safety improvement areas. Since 2004, Lithuania has been participating in the Association's Reactor Safety Harmonisation Working Group (RHWG) and the Working Group on Decommissioning and Radioactive Waste Management (WGWD).

In late 2001, the WGWD started harmonising the requirements for decommissioning and operation of radioactive waste repositories in the WENRA countries with a view to developing safety reference levels to be followed by WENRA countries. The safety reference levels are developed taking into account the existing legal frameworks and international guidance. The WGWD holds two meetings every year to discuss issues related to the review and benchmarking of nuclear safety supervision legislation in EU countries against the relevant safety reference levels. The WGWD Working Group also reviews and develops, within its remit, safety reference levels in the light of new international nuclear legislation.

In March 2025, the WGWD Working Group meeting reviewed the self-assessment reports submitted by the Bulgarian regulatory authority in the field of

decommissioning of the radioactive waste management facility, as well as the revised self-assessment submitted by the Ukrainian regulatory authority in the area of radioactive waste treatment.

The issue of harmonisation of safety reference levels falling within the WGWD areas of competence was discussed at the WGWD meeting in September 2025. The meeting also included a peer review of the self-assessment reports on radioactive waste treatment submitted by the Bulgarian and Lithuanian regulatory authorities. Following the review, the WGWD confirmed that the self-assessment submitted by Lithuania's regulatory authority, VATESI, in the area of radioactive waste treatment was acceptable. VATESI carried out a comprehensive self-assessment and revised its radioactive waste management requirements to address the gaps and inconsistencies identified during the self-assessment process.

European Nuclear Security Regulators Association (ENSRA)

The European Nuclear Security Regulators Association (ENSRA) is an inter-institutional organisation uniting European nuclear security regulatory and supervisory authorities. The ENSRA was established in 2004 to provide a platform for the Association members to share best practices and experience in nuclear security regulation, and thus contribute to building and maintaining effective nuclear security in Europe. VATESI joined the Association in 2013. The participation in the Association activities allows it to adopt best practices of other countries and thus strengthen the nuclear security regime of Lithuania.

In 2025, VATESI representatives attended a plenary meeting of the ENSRA in Czech Republic. During the meeting, ENSRA's second Vice-Chair was elected for a three-year term, with the position being filled by a representative of the Netherlands. Discussions focused on attracting new members to ENSRA, cooperation with WENRA and US institutions in the field of nuclear security, as well as upcoming international nuclear security events and opportunities for greater ENSRA involvement. Participants were also presented with an overview of recent discussions on the nuclear security aspects of small modular reactors and updates on the activities of ENSRA's working groups on Cyber Security, Transport Security, and Decommissioning and Dismantling. All ENSRA member countries attending the meeting presented information on major nuclear security developments and related work in their country. Considerable attention was also given to the review of publications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series and to discussions on the proposed revisions to the relevant documents.

European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA)

The objective of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) is to encourage organisations to exchange information related to nuclear material control and experience through the use of state-of-the-art safeguard application technologies. It brings together national nuclear safety regulators, NF operators, research and development centres, and universities working in the area of safeguards application. The Association is composed of members from European countries, Japan, the USA and the European Commission. Lithuania is represented in this Association by VATESI, which became a member in 2005. VATESI's representative is also a member of the ESARDA Steering Committee.

A remote meeting of ESARDA Steering Committee held in May 2025 focused on safeguards-related meetings and events planned for 2026, as well as their organisational arrangements.

IAEA technical cooperation projects

In compliance with the IAEA European Regional Programme for Technical Cooperation 2024-2025, and together with the Lithuanian Ministry of Energy and the RPC, VATESI coordinated the participation of Lithuanian experts in the following regional technical cooperation projects on nuclear safety and energy:

- RER0048 - Enhancing National Legal Frameworks;
- RER0049 - Enhancing the Capacities of Educational Institutions for the Sustainable use of Nuclear Technologies;
- RER2019 - Enhancing Capacity for the Subsequent Operation of Nuclear Power Plants Beyond their Existing Long-Term Operation Programmes;
- RER9148 - Strengthening the Regulatory Infrastructure for Radiation Safety;
- RER9149 - Improving the Radiation Protection of Workers Occupationally Exposed to Ionising Radiation;
- RER9151 - Updating and Harmonising Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans;
- RER9154 - Enhancing the Implementation of Integrated Programmes for the Safe Management of Radioactive Waste;
- RER9158 - Strengthening the Regulatory Infrastructure for Radiation Safety;
- RER9160 - Strengthening Capabilities on Safety Assessment and Risk Informed Decision Making for Severe Accidents and Off Site Consequences;




Meeting of VATESI nuclear material control and physical security specialists with representatives of the US Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Illicit Trafficking Detection and Prevention

- RER9161 - Strengthening Regional Capabilities for Effective Preparedness and Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency;
- RER9162 - Strengthening Education and Training Infrastructure in Radiation Protection;
- RER9164 - Building Capacity for Radioactive Waste Management.

In 2025, VATESI employees attended 23 events held under IAEA international and regional projects: workshops, conferences, technical meetings, and training courses. These events gave the VATESI employees the opportunity to learn about regulatory requirements and good practices in the areas of nuclear safety, radiation protection and physical security, as well as to exchange professional experience with international counterparts.

The implementation of the 2022-2025 IAEA Technical Cooperation National Project LIT9020 "Enhancing National Capabilities for Decommissioning and Radioactive Waste Management, Safety Assessment, Oversight, Licensing and Emergency Preparedness" was continued. In 2025, nine VATESI employees improved their expertise during research visits, conferences, seminars and workshops held within the framework of the IAEA national project. The IAEA support through national projects helps Lithuanian nuclear safety professionals to improve their emergency preparedness, technical knowledge on decommissioning and radioactive waste management, to know the most up-to-date international nuclear safety requirements and learn about best practices in other countries. Project funds were also used to finance the translation of documents into English and to procure ventilation equipment for the VATESI Emergency Operations Centre.

PUBLIC COMMUNICATION



Public communication

VATESI public communication activities are based on the principles of transparency and openness. The key goal is to provide the public and other stakeholders with relevant information on the regulation and supervision of compliance with nuclear safety, radiation protection, physical security and the international non-proliferation commitments undertaken by Lithuania.

VATESI responds to incoming inquiries, provides annual reports on the level of nuclear safety in Lithuania, and regularly informs the public about the results of supervision of economic entity activities. VATESI provides information to Lithuanian and foreign media on nuclear safety and radiation protection. VATESI experts attend events and meetings with representatives of various scientific projects, and organise events themselves.

The annual publication "Nuclear Power Safety in Lithuania" continued to be issued. The main channel for disseminating information by VATESI is its website, vatesi.lrv.lt.

In 2025, the main topics on which VATESI provided comments included safety issues related to the Belarusian NPP, the safety status of the Zaporizhzhya NPP and




Meeting with Ignalina district residents

the Chernobyl NPP during Russia's military aggression against Ukraine, as well as the potential radiological consequences arising from attacks on nuclear facilities in Iran.

Meetings with local communities

In autumn 2025, meetings were held with residents of the Ignalina District, Zarasai District and Visaginas. During these events, VATESI and RSC presented up-to-date information on the impact of Lithuania's NFs on public safety and the environment and answered questions of concern to local residents.

The impact of NFs operating in Lithuania on the environment and the public remains very low. During the meetings, VATESI representatives provided updates on the progress of the decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP, reviewed projects completed and in progress during the previous three years, presented the results of VATESI inspections and assessments of occupational and public radiation exposure, and encouraged greater public involvement in decision-making processes.



Comment for a TV news programme



Meeting with residents in Visaginas Municipality

Participants were particularly interested in the transport of radioactive waste from the Maišiagala radioactive waste storage facility and in the level of protection provided for spent nuclear fuel storage facilities against conventional threats. Questions were also raised regarding the lengthy timeframes foreseen for the development of a deep geological repository, the working conditions of Ignalina NPP personnel in relation to radiation exposure, the use of basements premises, methods of radon prevention in buildings, opportunities to conduct radon measurements, and whether environmental organisations submit comments on VATESI's draft decisions when the public is invited to participate in decision making and submit proposals.

The primary objective of these meetings is to regularly provide residents of municipalities located in the immediate vicinity of Lithuania's nuclear energy facilities with information on the impact of such facilities on public safety and the environment, and on the measures in place to ensure that radiological impacts on the population and the environment remain negligible and does not exceed established standards.

Public participation in the decision-making process

The public has the opportunity to be involved in making the most important decisions in the field of nuclear power: *approval of an assessment report of the nuclear facility construction location (site), licenses for construction and operation of nuclear facilities, nuclear*

facility decommissioning, supervision of closed radioactive waste repositories, and some *permits*, such as the import of nuclear or nuclear fuel cycle material to the nuclear facility site, and the first tests using this material (so-called hot tests).

It is of note that key decisions on the decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the design and construction of radioactive waste management facilities (repositories, storage facilities) are taken by the Lithuanian Government. Together with other government agencies, VATESI implements these decisions within its remit, i.e. by assessing the nuclear safety of the planned activities.

Public participation in the decision-making process of VATESI is regulated by the Law on Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.1.5-2017 "Rules of Procedure for Public Participation in Decision Making in the Area of Nuclear Energy" developed by VATESI.

Full information on how the public may participate and which decisions are open to public participation, as well as information on applications, draft decisions and decisions taken by VATESI is published on the VATESI website in the section "Public participation in decision making." Municipal administrations and local residents in the vicinity of NFs are informed about specific draft decisions and opportunities to participate in their adoption process. Furthermore, reports are developed and shared with the national and regional media.

All stages of public participation in the decision-making process are presented in the flowchart (p. 49).

Flowchart of the public participation in decision making



Operating and under construction nuclear power plants in the neighbouring countries

(distance from the border of Lithuania, km)



List of abbreviations

Bq	becquerel is the unit for measuring radioactivity in the International System of Units	NF	nuclear facility
BSR	Nuclear Safety Requirements	NPP	nuclear power plant
CNS	Convention on Nuclear Safety	RPC	Radiation Protection Centre
ENSRA	European Nuclear Security Regulators Association	SFSF-1	first dry-type spent fuel storage facility
ENSREG	European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group	SFSF-2	second spent fuel storage facility
ESARDA	European Safeguards Research and Development Association	SNRIU	Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority of Ukraine
Espoo	Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context	UAB	private limited liability company
EU	European Union	USIE	IAEA's information exchange systems
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community	VATESI	State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency	WebECURIE	European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange System
INES	International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale	WENRA	Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association
ITDB	IAEA's Incident and Trafficking Database	WGWD	WENRA Working Group on Decommissioning and Radioactive Waste Management
MBA	material balance area	WLTC	a material balance area for the accounting of materials of those nuclear material holders who do not have specific areas assigned by the European Commission
Maišiagala RWSF	Maišiagala Radioactive Waste Storage Facility		
mSv	millisievert (measurement unit for radiation exposure)		



NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY IN LITHUANIA

Annual Report 2025

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